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Vinson, Burton, Minton, and Clark. Scarcely household names, Presi-
dent Truman's four appointees to the Supreme Court tended to join the
more restrained of their senior colleagues to slow down the expansion of
civil liberties after the departures of Roberts and Stone at the end of
World War II and the premature deaths of Frank Murphy and Wiley
Rutledge in 1949.2
Harry N. Wyatt Professor of Law, University of Chicago. This article is part of a continuing
study of the Supreme Court's constitutional decisions. For earlier installments, see D. CURRIE, THE
CONSTITUTIoN IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS, 1789-1888 (1985) [herein-
after D. CURRIE]; Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Protection of Economic Inter-
ests, 1889-1910, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 324 (1985) [hereinafter Fuller I]; Currie, The Constitution in
the Supreme Court: Full Faith and the Bill of Rights, 1889-1910, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 867 (1985)
[hereinafter Fuller 11]; Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: 1910-1921, 1985 DUKE L.J.
1111 [hereinafter White]; Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: 1921-1930, 1986 DUKE
L.J. 65 [hereinafter Taft]; Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The New Deal, 1931-
1940, 54 U. Cm. L. REv. 504 (1987) [hereinafter Hughes I]; Currie, The Constitution in the Su-
preme Court: Civil Rights and Liberties, 1930-1941, 1987 DUKE L.J. 800 [hereinafter Hughes I1];
Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Second World War, 1941-1946, 37 CATH.
U.L. REv. 1 (1987) [hereinafter Stone I]; Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Pre-
ferred-Position Debate, 1941-1946, 37 CATH. U.L. REv. 39 (1987) [hereinafter Stone II]. I should
like to thank Geoffrey R. Stone and Cass Sunstein for valuable advice and criticism.
' See Frank, Fred Vinson and the Chief Justiceship, 21 U. CHI. L. REv. 212, 246 (1954)
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This period, however, witnessed great strides in the related field of civil
rights. The Vinson Court stretched the concept of state discrimination to
outlaw judicial enforcement of racial covenants, 3 put the final nail in the
coffin of the obnoxious white primary,4 and aggressively limited discrimi-
nation against aliens5 - while exhibiting an incongruous indifference to-
ward disadvantageous treatment of women.6
While federalism remained in its deep freeze,7 the Court struck a major
blow for the separation of powers by invalidating the President's seizure
of steel mills in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company v. Sawyer.8 More-
over, despite its general passivity in the face of the persecution of sus-
pected communists, the Court drew a brave line in Wieman v. Updegraff9
to limit indirect interference with first amendment freedoms. Indeed, the
Vinson period began with the incorporation of yet another of those free-
doms into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment; that is the
starting point of our inquiry.
(describing Vinson as a "symbol of the judicial age which reversed the trend of the Hughes-Stone
periods toward judicially enforced civil libert[ies]").
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
See infra note 178 and accompanying text.
a See infra notes 191-94 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 200-02 and accompanying text.
v See, e.g., Oklahoma v. Civil Service Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947) (Reed, J.) (upholding Con-
gress's power to condition federal highway grants on state's acceptance of limitations on political
activity of state employees); Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947) (Black, J.) (upholding power of
Congress to require state courts to entertain treble-damage actions under federal price legislation);
Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 141-44 (1948) (Douglas, J.) (upholding post-war
federal rent control to alleviate results of housing deficit caused in part by war); National Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949) (no majority opinion) (upholding Congressional
authority to grant federal court jurisdiction over controversies between citizens of the District of Co-
lumbia and citizens of a state); United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 44 (1950) (Clark, J.) (uphold-
ing federal tax on marijuana distributors); United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953) (Reed, J.,
over dissents on this point by Frankfurter and Douglas, JJ.) (upholding federal tax on business of
accepting wagers).
8 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
9 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
'" For table of Justices who served during the Vinson period, see page 251.
[Vol. 37250
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I. RELIGION
A. School Buses
"Congress shall make no law," reads the first amendment, "respect-
ing an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise there-
of . . ... " By their own terms, these provisions limit only the federal
government.12 While Hughes was Chief Justice, however, the Court had
held that religious freedom was part of the "liberty" the fourteenth
amendment protected against deprivation of without due process of law. 3
In Everson v. Board of Education, the Court concluded that the due pro-
JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT DURING THE TENURE OF CHIEF JUSTICE FRED VINSON
1946 - 1948 * 1950 * 1952 * 1954
Hugo L. Black (1937-1971)
Stanely F. Reed (1938-1957)
Felix Frankfurter (1939-1962)
William 0. Douglas (1939-1975)
Frank Murphy (1940-1949) I
Robert H. Jackson (1941-1954)
Wiley B. Rutledge (1943-1949) -
Harold H. Burton (1945-1958)
Fred M. Vinson (1946-1953) j
Tom C. Clark (1949-1967) I
Sherman Minton (1949-1956) I
SOURCE: Adopted from G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW app. B
(11th ed. 1985).
See generally G. DUNNE, HUGO BLACK AND THE JUDICIAL REVOLUTION (1977); H. THOMAS,
FELIX FRANKFURTER: SCHOLAR ON THE BENCH (1960); L. BAKER, FELIX FRANKFURTER (1969); J.
HOWARD, MR. JUSTICE MURPHY: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY (1968).
'l U.S. CONST. amend I.
12 See Permoli v. New Orleans, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589 (1845); ef. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S.
(7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (fifth amendment prohibition of takings without just compensation inapplicable to
states). See also D. CURRIE, supra note 1, at 189-93.
"3 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). See generally Hughes II, supra note 1, at 825-
26 (discussing Cantwell).
The only interesting free-exercise case decided during the Vinson period was Kedroff v. St.
Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952) (Reed, J.), holding over Justice Jackson's dissent that New
York could not transfer authority over the Russian Orthodox Church in America to local dissidents to
avoid communist influence after the Russian Revolution of 1917. For criticism, see P. KURLAND,
RELIGION AND THE LAW 96 (1978) ("Especially difficult to comprehend is the compulsory with-
drawal of state power in favor of 'ecclesiastical government' when the very issue in the case was which
of two ecclesiastical governments was entitled to make the decision.").
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cess clause made the establishment clause applicable to the states as
well. 1 '
There were no dissents on this point, and there was no discussion. The
difficulty was that the text did not lend itself to incorporation of the estab-
lishment clause. Unlike the provisions earlier held applicable to the states,
the clause in question does not speak in terms of "freedom." It was not
obvious that every establishment of religion would deprive anyone of "life,
liberty, or property." 15 Justice Black slid over the problem, as had Rob-
erts in the case of free exercise, with an overbroad invocation of precedent:
a free-exercise decision was said to have established that "the First
Amendment" applied to the states. 6 Earlier incorporation decisions, it is
true, had taken comparable liberties with the language. Not once, for ex-
ample, had the Justices explained the bearing of the limiting phrase
"without due process of law" upon state deprivation of freedom of reli-
gion, expression, or assembly.
The measure under attack in Everson provided government funds to
transport pupils to public and parochial schools. I" The Court upheld it 5-
4. Along the way, however, Justice Black gave the establishment clause a
broad construction going far beyond the prohibition of a national church
on the English model that the text suggested.
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a Church.
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or
prefer one religion over another .... No tax in any amount, large or
small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions.
... Neither a state nor the Federal Government can.., participate
in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice-
versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause ... was intended to
14 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
15 See Corwin, The Supreme Court as National School Board, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3,
19 (1949); M. HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS 72-73, 138 (1965) (adding that the
measure in Everson might be argued to deprive taxpayers of property but doubting that the four-
teenth amendment was meant to deprive states of their historic authority to support religion). But see
L. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 168 (1986) ("[F]reedom from an establishment ...is an
indispensable attribute of liberty.").
16 330 U.S. at 8 (citing Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1946)). Cf Cantwell, 310 U.S.
at 303 (citing a speech case for the proposition that liberty in the fourteenth amendment "embraces
the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment.").
17 330 U.S. at 3.
[Vol. 37
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erect 'a wall of separation between church and State."'
For this sweeping interpretation Black relied on the history of opposi-
tion to religious taxes in Virginia that lay behind Madison's drafting of
the first amendment. Opposing a bill to impose taxes to support teachers
of the Christian religion, Madison's famous Memorial and Remonstrance
had condemned the state's exaction of even "three pence" for religious
purposes. Jefferson's Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty, enacted in re-
sponse to the Remonstrance, had declared it "sinful and tyrannical" to
"compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of
opinions which he disbelieves."' 9
Justice Story had taken a narrower view of the Virginia Bill of Rights,
opining in 1815 that an impartial subsidy of all religions would be per-
missible.20 Many influential critics took the same view of the federal pro-
vision. The Court's history, however, suggests a concern that went beyond
the mere favoring of one sect over another. Against this background there
may be significance in the Framers' decision to not ban merely an "estab-
lishment" but all laws "respecting" one,2' and to define the forbidden es-
tablishment as one not of "a religion" but of "religion" in general.22
as Id. at 15-16 (emphasis in original).
19 Id. at 11-13 (quoting the Preamble of the Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty). See also id. at
33-41 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). Both the Remonstrance and the bill it protested are reprinted in full
as appendices to Justice Rutledge's opinion; see id. at 63-74.
20 See, e.g., Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43, 49 (1815) (dictum); T. COOLEY, PRINCI-
PLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 205 (1880) ("By establishment of religion is meant the setting up or
recognition of a state church, or at least the conferring upon one church of special favors and advan-
tages which are denied to others."); R. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 15 (1982); D.
CURRIE, supra note 1, at 140; M. HOWE, supra note 15, passim; Corwin, supra note 15, at 10-16;
Fahy, Religion, Education, and the Supreme Court, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 73 (1949); Mc-
Connell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 20-22; Meiklejohn, Educational Coop-
eration between Church and State, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 61 (1949); Murray, Law or Pre-
possessions?, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 23 (1949).
2' See 330 U.S. at 31 (Rutledge, J., dissenting); L. LEVY, supra note 15, at 95; Pfeffer, Church
and State: Something Less than Separation, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 14 (1951). But see Corwin, supra
note 15, at 12 (explaining "respecting" as "a two-edged word, which bans any law disfavoring as
well as any law favoring an establishment of religion") (emphasis in original).
22 The reported debates on the establishment clause are meager, but tend to suggest a narrower
interpretation. James Madison explained to the House of Representatives that his proposed amend-
ment ("no religion shall be established by law, nor shall the equal rights of conscience be infringed")
meant "that Congress should not establish a religion, and enforce the legal observation of it by law,
nor compel men to worship God in any manner contrary to their conscience" and said it should quiet
fears that "one sect might obtain a pre-eminence, or two combine together, and establish a religion to
19881
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The dissenters thought it followed from the Court's reasoning that the
busing provision was unconstitutional.2" Because the state's assistance
could not be attributed only to secular instruction, Justice Black's criteria
seemed to fit perfectly:24 In subsidizing bus rides to places where religious
instruction was given, the state "aid[ed] . . .religion" by spending tax
money "to support . . . religious activities."25 "[T]he most fitting prece-
dent" for the majority opinion, Justice Jackson suggested, was "that of
Julia who, according to Byron's reports, 'whispering "I will ne'er con-
sent," - consented.' ")26
In the same sense, however, the state supports religion when it puts out
a fire in a church or protects it against thieves.27 "[W]e must be careful,"
wrote Justice Black, "that we do not inadvertently prohibit New Jersey
from extending its general state law benefits to all its citizens without
regard to their religious belief." The first amendment "requires the state
to be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-
believers; it does not require the state to be their adversary. "28
This argument takes on added force when one considers the free exer-
cise clause of the same amendment. To put out fires for everybody except
churches would unconstitutionally discriminate against them.29
which they would compel others to conform." I Annals of Cong. 757-58 (j. Gales ed. 1789). Professor
Levy finds support for the Court's reading in the fact that by 1791 no state "maintained a single or
preferential establishment of religion" and in the rejection of three narrow Senate versions of the
establishment clause that would have barred Congress from "establishing articles of faith or a mode of
worship." See L. LEVY, supra note 15, at xvi, 82-84. See also L. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE AND
FREEDOM, ch. 5 (rev. ed. 1967); Kurland, The Origins of the Religion Clauses of the Constitution, 27
WM. & MARY L. REv. 839 (1986).
'3 See 330 U.S. at 18-28 (Jackson, J., joined by Frankfurter, J., dissenting); 330 U.S. at 28-63
(Rutledge, J., joined by Frankfurter, Jackson, and Burton, JJ., dissenting).
"I See 330 U.S. at 29 n.3, 44-49 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
25 Id. at 16 (Black, J.).
'0 Id. at 19 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
27 Id. at 17 (Black, J.).
s8 Id. at 16-18. See also M. HOWE, supra note 15, at 139 (arguing that the decision may have
been influenced by "the Court's mounting concern for equality"); Katz, Freedom of Religion and
State Neutrality, 20 U. CHs. L. REv. 426, 432 (1953).
29 See 330 U.S. at 17-18 ("State power is no more to be used so as to handicap religions than it is
to favor them."). See P. KURLAND, supra note 13, at 82; Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablish-
ment, and Doctrinal Development: Part II. The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HARV. L. REv. 513,
520-21 (1968).
The dissenters noted with some force that the measure in question actually provided transportation
only for pupils in public and in Catholic schools, thus raising difficulties of favoritism for a particular
[Vol. 37
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B. Released Time
The following year, in another opinion by Justice Black, the Court em-
ployed the tools fashioned in Everson to strike down a state measure that
promoted religion alone in Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educa-
tion.30 The measure released public school pupils from secular studies to
attend religious classes in public classrooms. 3' "[Niot only are the State's
tax-supported public school buildings used for the dissemination of reli-
gious doctrines," wrote Justice Black, "[tihe State also affords sectarian
groups an invaluable aid in that it helps to provide pupils for their reli-
gious classes through use of the State's compulsory public school machin-
ery. This is not separation of Church and State."3 2
Four years later, however, the Court upheld a released time program
by a divided vote in Zorach v. Clauson.3 3 "We are a religious people,"
wrote Justice Douglas in accents that betrayed no hint of neutrality,
"whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being."3 4 The program in Zo-
rach was permissible, he concluded, because religious instruction took
place on private rather than public property. In contrast to McCollum, no
tax money was used to promote religion.35
But the use of public property was only one of the objections the Court
had emphasized in McCollum,3 6 and arguably not the most important
religion. 330 U.S. at 20-21 (Jackson, J., dissenting); 330 U.S. at 61-62 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
Justice Black responded by arguing that this issue had not properly been raised. 330 U.S. at 4 n.2
("[A]ppellant does not allege.., that there were any children in the township who attended or would
have attended, but for want of transportation, any but public and Catholic schools.").
30 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
31 Id. at 205-09.
32 Id. at 212. Frankfurter, joined by the other three Justices who had dissented in Everson,
wrote a concurring opinion, 330 U.S. at 212-32, as did Justice Jackson, 330 U.S. at 232-38. While
professing to accept the interpretation of the establishment clause announced in Everson, Justice
Reed, as the sole dissenter, actually seemed to call it into question by noting the existence of congres-
sional and military chaplains and Jefferson's approval of religious instruction at the University of
Virginia, adding that "[tihe phrase 'an establishment of religion' may have been intended ... to be
aimed only at a state church." 330 U.S. at 238, 244 (Reed, J., dissenting).
33 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
34 Id. at 313.
3 Id. at 308-09, 315.
"' Symbolism, though not stressed in the opinion, was another objection: when religious instruc-
tion is given in public buildings, it appears to the public as part of the state's educational program.
See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 825 (1978); cf. Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball,
473 U.S. 373 (1985) (conversely striking down a shared time and community education program
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one. As Justice Jackson pointed out in dissent, in both Zorach and Mc-
Collum "schooling ... serves as a temporary jail for a pupil who will not
go to church."3 The distinction between Zorach and McCollum was
,,trivial.3S
Justices Black and Frankfurter, intellectual leaders of the active and
passive wings of the Court, added emphatic dissents of their own.39 It is
food for thought when the Court's three strongest members take issue
with its conclusions. 40
II. SPEECH
A. Peace and Quiet
1. State Power
In Saia v. New York, in 1948, the Court struck down an ordinance
requiring a permit for the use of loudspeakers that might inconvenience
people in public places."' In Kovacs v. Cooper, a year later, the Court
upheld an ordinance forbidding loudspeakers on the streets even though it
did not authorize the issuance of permits at all.42
providing for sending public teachers into parochial schools); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth.,
365 U.S. 715, 720, 724 (1961) (suggesting analogous argument in holding state responsible for private
decision to serve only white patrons in restaurant built with public funds and operated by an agency
of the state on public property). This difficulty was reduced in Zorach by the fact that public property
was not involved. See generally Marshall, "We Know It When We See It": The Supreme Court and
Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 495 (1986).
37 343 U.S. at 324.
8 Id. at 325 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Douglas's response that there was "no evidence" to sup-
port the suggestion of coercion missed the point. Id. at 311. Coercion was inherent in the program.
See Cushman, Public Support of Religious Education in American Constitutional Law, 45 ILL. L.
REV. 333, 353 (1950) ("A state which says to a pupil, 'You must study religion or sit in study-hall,' is
not taking a neutral attitude toward religion."). Moreover, as Justice Frankfurter noted in dissent,
evidence of coercion had been excluded. Zorach, 343 U.S. at 321-22 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See
P. KURLAND, supra note 13, at 86 ("Most of what McCollum had done... was undone a few years
later in Zorach ....").
39 343 U.S. at 315-20 (Black, J., dissenting); 343 U.S. at 320-23 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
40 A further important establishment issue was postponed when the Court, over three dissents,
held that a taxpayer had no standing to challenge Bible reading in the public schools. "There is no
allegation that this activity ... adds any sum whatever to the cost of conducting the school." Doremus
v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 433 (1952) (Jackson, J.).
41 334 U.S. 558 (1948) (Douglas, J.).
42 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
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Both decisions were 5-4; only Chief Justice Vinson thought the cases
distinguishable. Justices Black and Jackson, who were on opposite sides
in each case, believed that the Court had it backwards: the ordinance the
Court upheld limited speech more than the one the Court struck down,
for the latter authorized the police to waive the restriction.4
In so concluding, Black and Jackson took no account of the dangers of
discriminatory application that had condemned the permit provision in
Saia. As Justice Douglas wrote in that case, the ordinance provided "no
standards" to guide the determination of whether to authorize a loud-
speaker.44 "The right to be heard is placed in the uncontrolled discretion
of the Chief of Police."4 Since the 1930s, the Court had consistently stood
firm against such discretionary power to favor among potential speakers.46
The only surprising thing about Saia was that Frankfurter, Reed, Jack-
son, and Burton dissented.
The flat prohibition in Kovacs, while more restrictive, avoided this risk
of arbitrary enforcement; the question was whether it was a reasonable
regulation of the time, place, and manner of speaking. Under Hughes, the
Court had held that the state could not ban all handbilling or picketing in
the streets; under Stone, it had held door-to-door solicitation equally pro-
tected.4" Without citing these cases, Justice Black invoked their reasoning
" Id. at 98 (Jackson, J., concurring); 336 U.S. at 101 (Black, J., dissenting).
44 Saia, 334 U.S. at 560.
41 Id. at 560-61.
46 Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Lovell v.
Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938); cf. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (administrative au-
thority to determine what constituted religion). Cf. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941)
(upholding permit ordinance limited to determining traffic effect of parades); see generally Hughes II,
supra note 1, at 821-22 (discussing these cases). The Saia rationale was followed in two subsequent
cases. See Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 272-73 (1951) (Vinson, C.J.) (invalidating standar-
dless requirements for park permits); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 293, 295 (1951) (Vinson,
C.J., over a dissent by Jackson, J.) (invalidating standardless requirements for street permits).
7 Ignoring the precedents respecting administrative discretion, the dissenters essentially argued
that the city need not allow noise in the parks - a separate issue that the majority did not have to
reach. See 334 U.S. at 562-66 (Frankfurter, J., joined by Reed and Jackson, JJ., dissenting); 334
U.S. at 566-72 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
48 Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Schnei-
der v. State, 308 U.S. 149 (1939). See generally Hughes II, supra note 1, at 821-22, 827-28 (discuss-
ing Schneider, where the Court struck down ordinances prohibiting the distribution of handbills on
public streets and Thornhill, which struck down an overbroad ban on picketing); Stone II, supra note
1, at 51-52 (discussing Martin, striking down ordinances prohibiting the distribution of handbills by
going door-to-door).
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in his Kovacs dissent: sound trucks were the poor man's press, and bar-
ring them stacked the deck in favor of those with more money. 9 As in the
solicitation case, Jackson and Frankfurter balanced the opposing interests
in favor of privacy.5 Three Justices, in an opinion by Reed, read the
ordinance to forbid only "loud and raucous" noises and voted to uphold
it.51
As Justice Reed noted, sound trucks are more intrusive than handbills,
which the passerby need not read; "[tlhe unwilling listener ... is practi-
cally helpless to escape .. ."52 They are likewise more intrusive than the
solicitor, who the Court had said could be kept away by no-trespassing
signs. 53 Justice Black conceded that the state could limit the volume,
hours, and location of amplifiers,54 and Justice Reed agreed that a total
ban would "probably" be unconstitutional. 5 They thus seemed to differ
only as to the meaning of the statute and of the judgment below. Both
seemed to strike an appropriate balance between the competing interests,5 6
and together they spoke for a clear majority of the Court.5
19 336 U.S. at 102-03 (Black, J., dissenting). See Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U.
CHI. L. REv. 46, 66 (1987).
50 See 336 U.S. at 89-97 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); 336 U.S. at 97-98 (Jackson, J., concur-
ring); cf Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 152-57 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); 319 U.S. at
166-82 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
5 336 U.S. at 82-89 (opinion of Reed, J., joined by Vinson, C.J., and Burton, J.). Justice Black
took Reed to task for interpreting the ordinance more narrowly than it had apparently been under-
stood by the state court and for finding the defendant guilty of an offense with which he had never
been charged. The complaint was simply that he had operated a sound truck on the street. 336 U.S. at
98-100 (Black, J., joined by Douglas and Rutledge, JJ., dissenting).
52 336 U.S. at 86-87. See Stone, Fora Americana: Speech in Public Places, 1974 Sup. CT. REV.
233, 269 (adding that the unwilling listener in the loudspeaker case "is in his home, his 'castle,' where
his right to be let alone is at its peak").
s 336 U.S. at 86. See Martin, 319 U.S. 141, 148 (1943).
336 U.S. at 104 (Black, J., dissenting).
55 Id. at 81-82.
" See Frank, The United States Supreme Court: 1948-49, 17 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 29 (1949)
[hereinafter Frank, 1948-49] ("[Ilt is hard to find in the Constitution a requirement that anyone...
can be compelled to hear a message which he does not choose to hear.").
'7 Justice Frankfurter's concurrence in Kovacs was largely devoted to an attack on Reed's invo-
cation of the "preferred position" terminology that had characterized recent speech and religion deci-
sions. 336 U.S. at 89-97. See 336 U.S. at 88 & n.14 (discussing preferred-position and citing, e.g.,
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943)). See generally Stone II, supra note 1, at 48-52
(discussing earlier preferred-position opinions).
While condemning such language as "deceptive" and "mechanical," Frankfurter seemed to modify
his earlier position considerably by conceding that "those liberties of the individual which history has
attested as the indispensable conditions of an open as against a closed society come to this Court with
HeinOnline  -- 37 Emory L. J. 258 1988
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It was nonetheless portentious that the four Justices who had voted
with Stone to protect door-to-door solicitation in Martin v. Struthers
found themselves in dissent in seeking to protect sound trucks. Two years
after Kovacs, in Breard v. Alexandria,"0 Martin itself was held inappli-
cable to salesmen soliciting magazine subscriptions because "selling . . .
brings into the transaction a commercial feature" absent in the earlier
case.59 Justices Stone, Rutledge, and Murphy having died, the number of
votes to strike down the prohibition on speech grounds was reduced to
two, 0 and the majority's opinion seemed to cast doubt on Martin itself. 1
The pendulum seemed to have swung away from aggressive protection of
expression.
2. State Duty
In Kovacs the Court held the state was permitted to protect the unwill-
ing listener against loudspeakers. In Public Utilities Commission v. Pol-
lak, two Justices argued it was required to do so.62 The Capital Transit
Company, operating in the District of Columbia under a franchise
granted by Congress, broadcast radio programs through loudspeakers in-
side its buses and streetcars. When some passengers protested, the Public
Utilities Commission concluded that the broadcasts "tend[ed] to improve
the conditions under which the public ride" and thus were "not inconsis-
tent with public convenience, comfort and safety." 3 The Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia held that the complaining passengers had
been deprived of their liberty without due process of law."' A divided Su-
preme Court reversed.
a momentum for respect lacking when appeal is made to liberties which derive merely from shifting
economic arrangements." Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 95-96. Compare West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Bar-
nette, 319 U.S. 625, 646-71 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see also Stone II, supra note 1, at
53-55 (discussing Barnette).
B' 341 U.S. 622 (1951) (Reed, J.).
8, Id. at 642-43.
So See id. at 649-50 (Black and Douglas, JJ., dissenting). Chief Justice Vinson, joined by Justice
Douglas, dissented on the ground that the ordinance unreasonably burdened interstate commerce. Id.
at 645-49.
61 See id. at 644-45 (balancing the interests in favor of privacy without considering the alterna-
tive of posting signs); id. at 627 (noting that this alternative "was rejected early as less practical").
62 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
3 Id. at 454.
- 191 F.2d 450 (D.C. Cir. 1951), rev'd, 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
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Justice Douglas, in dissent, agreed with the lower court that due pro-
cess had been denied. "Liberty" in the fifth amendment, he argued in a
passage that foreshadowed important developments, included "privacy,"
because "[t]he right to be let alone is indeed the beginning of all free-
dom." 5 Transit riders were "a captive audience," because many had no
alternative means of transportation." Thus the case "involves a form of
coercion to make people listen," and "[i]f liberty is to flourish, government
should never be allowed to force people to listen to any radio program. '6 7
For a Justice who had denounced substantive due process arguments only
a few years earlier as "notions of public policy" that "should not be read
into the Constitution,"6 this sounded remarkably like Lochner v. New
York. 9 The majority disagreed on the blandest and narrowest of grounds:
most riders enjoyed the broadcasts, and "[tlhe liberty of each individual in
a public vehicle or public place is subject to reasonable limitations in rela-
tion to the rights of others.1"70
Justice Black, who agreed with the Court that the broadcasting of mu-
sic offended nothing in the Constitution, came up with a more novel ob-
jection to other transmissions. "[Slubjecting . . . passengers to the broad-
casting of news, public speeches, views, or propaganda of any kind and by
any means would violate the First Amendment." He did not say why,
and the majority said only that the issue was not properly presented:
"There is no substantial claim that the programs have been used for ob-
jectionable propaganda." 72
Compelling people to listen to propaganda conjures up visions of the
5 343 U.S. at 467 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
66 Id. at 468.
67 Id. at 468-69 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
68 Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236, 247 (1941) (overruling Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350
(1928), a case that struck down regulations on employment agencies). See generally Hughes I, supra
note 1, at 546.
69 198 U.S. 45 (1905). See generally Fuller I, supra note 1, at 378-82 (discussing Lochner).
70 343 U.S. at 465.
" Id. at 466 (separate opinion of Black, J.).
72 Id. at 463. Since the programs evidently included news broadcasts and other "matters of civic
interest," the Court's reasoning does not seem wholly responsive. Id. at 461. Justice Black dissented
"Itlo the extent, if any," that the Court allowed the broadcast of news or views in Pollak. Id. at 466.
No Justice argued that the broadcasts were so loud as to interfere with communication among the
passengers.
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police state of Orwell's 1984, 7 but it is not obvious that it has anything
to do with freedom of speech. The first amendment's focus is on the right
to communicate; even the flag-salute case had relied on the right to deter-
mine whiat one would say.74 A general right not to be spoken to seems
more remote from the purposes of free expression."5
The most striking aspect of the Pollak decision, however, was the will-
ingness of the entire Court to address the first and fifth amendment ques-
tions at all, since the decision to play music in the buses and streetcars had
been made by a private corporation.7 6 Although the fifth amendment
speaks in the passive voice without identifying the actors it means to
limit,1 history and precedent made clear that, like the rest of the Bill of
Rights, it was designed to apply only to the federal government. The par-
ties conceded that neither amendment restricted private actions.7 8
Writing for the Court, Justice Burton nevertheless found "a sufficiently
close relation between the Federal Government and the radio service to
make it necessary for us to consider those Amendments. 7M9 This was not
because the company held a franchise granted by Congress, and not be-
cause Congress had given it "a substantial monopoly."8 It was because
the company operated "under the regulatory supervision" of a governmen-
tal commission, and particularly because that agency, "after formal public
hearings, ordered its investigation dismissed on the ground that the public
73 See Black, He Cannot Choose But Hear: The Plight of the Captive Auditor, 53 COLUM. L.
REv. 960 (1953).
71 West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); see generally Stone II, supra
note 1, at 52-55 (discussing Barnette).
7' There have been suggestions that compulsory attendance at school prayers, quite apart from
establishment problems, would infringe the free exercise of religion. This conclusion would not com-
pel agreement with Justice Black's parallel argument respecting free speech, for the two provisions
need not in all respects be congruent. Forced exposure to alien doctrine may easily offend religious
tenets without interfering with freedom of expression. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 423-24
n.2 (1962). (quoting the trial court opinion).
7' See 343 U.S. at 454 ("The Capital Transit Company ... is a privately-owned public utility
corporation. .. ").
77 U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall any person.., be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law. .. ").
78 343 U.S. at 461-62 (citing, inter alia, Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833)). See
also D. CURRIE, supra note 1, at 189-93 (discussing Barron, which held that the takings provision of
the fifth amendment was inapplicable to the states).
79 343 U.S. at 462.
80 Id.
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safety, comfort and convenience were not impaired.""1
The monopoly argument that Burton disdained seems in fact the
strongest argument for holding the government responsible. If the distinc-
tion between public and private action means anything at all, it cannot be
that a mere refusal to prevent private action - and that is all the dismis-
sal of the investigation had been - activates constitutional limitations ap-
plicable only to government. If the government denies to the citizen all
other practicable means of transportation, however, it may have to share
responsibility for additional limits that the monopolist places upon his
freedom. The government may not have a general duty to feed the people;
but if it locks a man up without feeding him, it deprives him of life. 2
Burton's treatment of the issue was as sketchy as that provided here -
perhaps because he did not necessarily mean to resolve it. In the next
breath he proceeded to consider the substantive issues, "assuming that the
action of Capital Transit ... together with the action of the Commission
. ..amounts to sufficient Federal Government action to make the First
and Fifth Amendments applicable."8 3 With this apparent disclaimer in
mind, a second glance at the Court's earlier conclusion reveals a conspicu-
ous flabbiness. Burton wrote that the government's connection to the
broadcasting was sufficiently close "to make it necessary for us to con-
sider" the amendments, not to make them applicable.8 4 That may have
been only to say that the relationship was close enough that the argument
of state involvement could not be rejected out of hand; rather than resolve
the question, it was preferable to dismiss the less troublesome substantive
arguments on the assumption that the government was responsible.8 '
Thus Pollak was tantalizingly inconclusive on its novel theories of both
free speech and government responsibility. The Court's unwillingness to
take a firm stand may have reflected only a traditional reluctance to decide
more than was necessary, but the seriousness with which it took such ar-
guments suggested we had not heard the last of them.
81 Id.
82 See Black, supra note 73, at 963-64; Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53
U. CI. L. REv. 864, 874 (1986).
343 U.S. at 462-63 (emphasis added).
84 Id. at 462.
"I The other Justices were silent on the issue. Justices Black and Douglas, who argued against
constitutionality, were implicitly willing to find the government responsible.
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B. The Heckler's Veto
Terminiello v. Chicago involved the disorderly conduct conviction of a
public speaker who had engendered such strong feelings in his speech as
to precipitate a riot."6 His anti-Communist and anti-Semitic diatribe ap-
pealed to some of his listeners' prejudices, and a hostile crowd outside the
building threw bricks through the windows. Although present in force, the
police were unable to control the situation. The state appellate courts sus-
tained conviction of the speaker on the ground that he had employed
"fighting words" calculated to provoke reasonable listeners to violence,8
which the whole Court had held punishable in Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire.88
Justice Jackson, who argued for affirmance of the conviction in his dis-
sent, contended more broadly that Terminiello had "provoked a hostile
mob and incited a friendly one." '89 Fresh from his extrajudicial labors in
prosecuting Nazi war criminals at Nuremberg, Jackson compared what
had happened in Terminiello to the street battles between Fascists and
Communists that had preceded Adolf Hitler's rise to power and argued
that Terminiello's speech had created a clear and present danger of rioting
that the state had a right to prevent. 90
To the dismay of Jackson and his fellow dissenters, Justice Douglas's
majority opinion avoided these troublesome questions as well as the origi-
nal issue of fighting words by concluding that the statute as construed
below was too broad. The state could not punish people for every speech
that "stirs the public to anger, invites dispute, [or] brings about a condi-
tion of unrest."9" It is "a function of free speech under our system to
invite dispute."92 In fact, speech "may . . . best serve its high purpose
when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with condi-
88 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
87 337 U.S. at 2-3 (1949); id. at 6-8 (Vinson, O.J., dissenting); id. at 14-23 (Jackson, J., dis-
senting). See generally Stone II, supra note 1, at 47-48 (discussing Chaplinsky).
315 U.S. 568 (1942).
89 337 U.S. at 13 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
90 Id. at 23-26 ("It was a local manifestation of a worldwide and standing conflict between two
organized groups of revolutionary fanatics, each of which has imported to this country the strong-arm
technique developed in the struggle by which their kind has devastated Europe."). Id. at 23.
9' Id. at 4.
92 Id.
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tions as they are, or even stirs people to anger."93 It was irrelevant that
Terminiello's speech might have been punished under a different law.
Like the red-flag statute struck down in Stromberg v. California,9 the
statute under which he had been convicted was invalid because it out-
lawed speech that created no clear and present danger of substantive
harm.95
The issues Jackson raised in Terminiello arose once again in Feiner v.
New York,9" after Minton and Clark had replaced Murphy and Rutledge.
This time Jackson's views prevailed. Feiner's street-corner speech, the
trial judge found, "gave the impression that he was endeavoring to arouse
the Negro people against the whites," and "at least one [onlooker]
threatened violence if the police did not act."9 ' Ultimately, "[b]ecause of
the feeling that existed in the crowd both for and against the speaker," the
police "'stepped in to prevent it from resulting in a fight.' "98 Feiner was
convicted of disorderly conduct, and the Supreme Court affirmed. 9
Quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut,'" Vinson emphasized that the state
could punish "'incitement to riot,' " noting that "'[w]hen clear and pre-
sent danger of riot, disorder ... or other immediate threat to public
safety, peace, or order, appears, the power of the State to prevent or pun-
ish is obvious.' """1 What had been missing in Cantwell was present in
Feiner:
It is one thing to say that the police cannot be used as an instrument
for the suppression of unpopular views, and another to say that,
when as here the speaker passes the bounds of argument or persua-
93 Id.
283 U.S. 359 (1931). See generally Hughes II, supra note 1, at 813-15 (discussing
Stromberg).
95 337 U.S. at 4-5. Frankfurter, Vinson, Jackson, and Burton forcefully objected that the
breadth of the statute had never been questioned below. Id. at 6-13. Douglas irrelevantly responded
that Terminiello had raised "both points - that his speech was protected ... [and] that the inclusion
of his speech within the ordinance" was unconstitutional. Id. at 6 (emphasis added). The ground on
which the conviction was set aside had nothing to do with Terminiello's own speech.
- 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
97 Id. at 317.
98 Id. at 317-18.
99 Id. at 316, 321.
100 310 U.S. 296,-308 (1940).
201 340 U.S. at 320 (quoting Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 296, 308 (1940)) (reversing breach of peace
conviction for want of sufficient danger); see also Hughes II, supra note 1, at 825-27.
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sion and undertakes incitement to riot, they are powerless to prevent
a breach of the peace .... The findings of the state courts as to the
existing situation and the imminence of greater disorder coupled
with petitioner's deliberate defiance of the police officers [orders to
stop speaking] convince us that we should not reverse this conviction
in the name of free speech.1"2
Justice Black, dissenting, said there was no clear and present danger of
breach of the peace (as there had been in Terminiello). It was "far-
fetched to suggest" that there was "any imminent threat of riot or uncon-
trollable disorder." 103 Black made a more fundamental point as well: even
if the situation was critical, the police should have kept the peace by con-
trolling the crowd, not by silencing the speaker.'0 4 Douglas and Minton
echoed this argument in a separate dissent. If "the police throw their
weight on the side of those who would break up the meetings, the police
become the new censors of speech."' 0 5
Like Roberts in Cantwell and Jackson in Terminiello, the majority in
Feiner seemed to lump together two types of speakers who arguably
presented quite different constitutional problems: one who urges his audi-
ence to commit crimes and one whose audience wishes to silence him.
That the danger of disturbance may be equally clear and present in the
two cases merely exposes one of the defects of Holmes's mellifluous phrase
as a universal test of the limits of expression.' Incitement to crime is not
only dangerous but of little social value; the heckler's veto may deprive us
of arguments that lie at the heart of first amendment protection.' 0 7 The
inciter calls sanctions upon himself by blameworthy conduct; the heckler's
veto rewards the enemies of freedom for their misbehavior. Black and
Douglas were right: if the crowd refuses to let the speaker speak, it is the
crowd that should be punished.
102 340 U.S. at 321.
103 Id. at 325 (Black, J., dissenting). Black insisted, as precedent suggested, that the Court had a
duty to reassess the facts for itself to determine whether federal rights had been denied. Id. at 322 &
n.4 (citing Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 589-90 (1935)). See also Hughes II, supra note 1, at 805
n.32 (discussing Norris).
104 340 U.S. at 326-27 (Black, J., dissenting).
10. Id. at 331 (Douglas, J., joined by Minton, J., dissenting).
10" See P. FREUND, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 44 (1961).
107 This also distinguishes fighting words, which tend to provoke even reasonable people to vio-
lence and which can be avoided without suppressing whatever message the speaker wishes to convey.
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A later Court would recognize this in holding that widespread public
opposition did not justify abandoning the constitutional ban on racial ex-
clusion from public schools.110 Although Feiner seems to look in the oppo-
site direction, a studied ambiguity surrounds both Vinson's opinion and
the passage from Cantwell on which he relied. In each case the talk of
clear and present danger was coupled with the term "incitement to riot"
in such a way as to leave it unclear whether the former, was intended as
an alternative ground for upholding conviction'0" or as an additional re-
quirement even in cases of incitement - as the Court would later hold in
one of its briefest and greatest opinions.110 In any event, because the
Court concluded that Feiner had incited his hearers to riot, anything the
opinion implied as to the hecklers' power was unnecessary to the
decision."'
C. Group Libel
A leaflet distributed in Chicago called upon the City "'to halt the fur-
ther encroachment, harassment and invasion of white people, their prop-
108 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1958).
109 In a concurring opinion also applying to Feiner, Justice Frankfurter appeared to take this
position: "It is not a constitutional principle that, in acting to preserve order, the police must proceed
against the crowd, whatever its size and temper, and not against the speaker." Niemotko v. Maryland,
340 U.S. 268, 289 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
110 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
1 Traditional incitement principles also go far to justify several decisions of the Vinson period
upholding the prohibition of picketing whose object was to bring about actions in violation of the law.
See Local Union No. 10, United Ass'n of Journeymen Plumbers v. Graham, 345 U.S. 192 (1953)
(Burton, J.) (violation of Right-To-Work law); International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 341
U.S. 694, 705 (1951) (Burton, J.) (secondary boycott); Building Serv. Employees v. Gazzam, 339
U.S. 532 (1950) (Minton, J.) (employer interference with choice of bargaining representative); Inter-
national Bhd. of Teamsters v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470 (1950) (no majority opinion) (involuntary union
shop); Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950) (Frankfurter, J.) (racial quota in hiring);
Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949) (Black, J.) (refusal to deal with non-
union ice peddlers). See also Cox, Strikes, Picketing and the Constitution, 4 VAND. L. REV. 574, 595
(1951) (" 'Signal picketing' is entitled to no greater constitutional protection than the combination it
sets in motion."); Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 HARV. L.
REv. 1, 26-27 (1947) ("Banning the use of secondary strikes and boycotts as weapons of organization
is primarily a prohibition against economic pressures; the interference with freedom of persuasion is
relatively slight since all avenues of communication except the picket line are left open."); Stone II,
supra note 1, at 46 n.2 (discussing Giboney as well as earlier picketing cases). For a more critical
assessment, see Fraenkel, Peaceful Picketing - Constitutionally Protected?, 99 U. PA. L. REa. 1
(1950).
[Vol. 37
HeinOnline  -- 37 Emory L. J. 266 1988
SUPREME COURT: 1946-1953
erty, neighborhoods and persons, by the Negro.' "'1 The leaflet added
that "'[i]f persuasion and the need to prevent the white race from becom-
ing mongrelized by the negro will not unite us, then the aggressions...
rapes, robberies, knives, guns and marijuana of the negro, surely
will.' ""' The distributor of this leaflet was prosecuted under an Illinois
statute forbidding certain publications or exhibitions " 'which . . . por-
tray[] depravity, criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue in a class of citi-
zens, of any race, color, creed or religion ... [and] expose[] the citizens of
any race, color, creed or religion to contempt, derision or obloquy.' """
President Truman's four appointees joined Justice Frankfurter's 1952
opinion in Beauharnais v. Illinois to uphold the conviction.1 5 The other
four Roosevelt appointees - Black, Douglas, Reed, and Jackson -
dissented.""0
Frankfurter resolved the case by an exercise in taxonomy. Libel of an
individual had always been a crime, which Justice Murphy's dictum in
Chaplinsky had ranked with fighting words as a "class[] of speech, the
prevention and punishment of which ha[s] never been thought to raise any
Constitutional problem.""17 It would surely be libelous to brand an indi-
vidual "a rapist, robber, carrier of knives and guns, and user of mari-
juana.""' 8 Furthermore, the state might "warrantably believe that a man's
job and his educational opportunities and the dignity accorded him may
depend as much on the reputation of the racial and religious group to
which he willy-nilly belongs, as on his own merits."" 9 Extending the
traditional libel law to statements disparaging an entire racial or religious
group was thus not "a wilful and purposeless restriction unrelated to the
peace and well-being of the State," and no clear and present danger of
injury was required since "[1]ibelous utterances" were not "within the
area of constitutionally protected speech."'2 0
112 Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 252 (1950) (quoting leaflet distributed by the
defendant).
I's Id. at 252.
114 Id. at 251 (quoting ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, para. 471 (1949)).
115 Id. at 250, 251-67 (1952).
116 Id. at 267-305.
1" Id. at 256 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942)).
118 Id. at 257-58.
11I Id. at 263.
110 Id. at 258-66. On the other hand, when New York attempted to protect religious groups
from "contempt, mockery, scorn and ridicule" by requiring a license to exhibit motion pictures, the
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History indeed furnished powerful evidence that punishment of garden-
variety defamation had been thought consistent with freedom of expres-
sion. As Frankfurter acknowledged, however, the historical record was not
so clear as to statements that disparaged entire classes of the popula-
tion.12' Moreover, as Justice Black observed in dissent, the differences be-
tween individual and group libels were relevant to the reasons why it was
appropriate that ordinary libel be denied protection. 22
At first glance one might think it obvious that defaming an entire race
was worse than defaming an individual. Group libel, however, may actu-
ally do less harm to the individual. To call blacks a race of "gun-toting
rapists" says little about the habits of any particular black. Alhough it
would be hard to deny the destructive power of group defamation, 2 ' re-
duced harm to the individual arguably makes less pressing "the social in-
terest in order and morality" on which Murphy relied in Chaplinsky.
More important are the differences between individual and group libel
with respect to the other side of Murphy's calculus, the "social value" of
the proscribed communication. Traditional libel law, said Black, "con-
fined state punishment of speech and expression to the narrowest of areas
involving nothing more ,than purely private feuds. Every expansion of the
law of criminal libel so as to punish discussions of matters of public con-
cern means a corresponding invasion of the area dedicated to free expres-
sion by the First Amendment." 24 The leaflet in question presented "ar-
guments on questions of wide public interest and importance;" 25 "to
petition for and publicly discuss proposed legislation" could not constitu-
Court predictably invalidated the scheme as a previous restraint, adding in contrast to Beauharnais
that "[ilt is not the business of government... to suppress real or imagined attacks upon a particular
religious doctrine." Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 505 (1952) (Clark, J.). Justice
Reed concurred in Burstyn on the ground that the particular movie at issue was constitutionally
protected. Id. at 506-07. Justices Frankfurter and Jackson concurred on the ground that the statutory
term "sacrilege" was unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 507-40.
121 343 U.S. at 258.
22 Id. at 272-75 (Black, J., joined by Douglas, J., dissenting).
"' See Arkes, Civility and the Restriction of Speech: Rediscovering the Defamation of Groups,
1974 Sop. CT. REV. 281, 291-92; Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Control of Group Libel, 42
CoLuM. L. REv. 727, 728 (1942) ("In the rise of the Nazis to power in Germany, defamation was a
major weapon."); Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Fair Game and Fair Comment 1, 42
COLUM. L. REV. 1085 (1942) (describing the Nazi strategy).
124 343 U.S. at 272 (Black, J., dissenting).
125 Id. at 273.
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tionally be made a crime. 26
Kovacs, Breard, and Feiner might perhaps be explained away, but
Beauharnais left no doubt that freedom of expression was in retreat.
Murphy and Rutledge were sorely missed. To say the state could forbid
statements on political topics of general public interest because they ex-
posed a racial group to "obloquy" seemed to cut deeply into first amend-
ment values.12
Most ominous was the majority's acceptance of an extremely deferential
attitude toward legislative judgments that Frankfurter alone had exhibited
in the second flag-salute case.1 28 To ask only whether the extension of
libel laws to matters of public interest was "wilful and purposeless"
seemed inconsistent with Frankfurter's own concession in Kovacs that
"those liberties ... which history has attested as the indispensable condi-
tions of an open . . . society come to this Court with a momentum for
respect lacking when appeal is made to liberties which derive merely from
shifting economic arrangements."' 2 9 As Douglas implied, the Court
seemed to be saying expression was as subject to regulation as "factories,
slums, apartment houses, [and the] production of oil." '' 3
126 Id. at 275. Jackson's dissent, echoing Black's concern for "the right to comment upon matters
of public interest," stressed the absence of any showing of clear and present danger, adding that the
trial judge had excluded evidence of truth and submitted only the issue of publication to the jury. Id.
at 299-305. Justice Reed thought the vague statutory terms "virtue," "derision," and "obloquy" in-
cluded speech that could not constitutionally be punished. Id. at 280-84. Justice Douglas waved the
flag. Id. at 284-87. There was no suggestion that Beauharnais had incited anyone to the commission
of crime, provoked a hostile audience to endanger the public peace, or addressed fighting words to any
individual within fighting range. See id. at 272-73, 302 (Black and Jackson, JJ., dissenting). For an
argument against letting juries decide the "truth" of racial slurs, see Arkes, supra note 123, at 301-
02.
227 See H. KALVEN, THE NEGRO AND THE FiRsT AMENDMENT 50-51 (1965).
128 See generally Stone II, supra note 1, at 52-55 (discussing West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)); Frank, The United States Supreme Court: 1951-52, 20 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1, 27 (1952).
'2, Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
130 343 U.S. at 286 (Douglas, J., dissenting). See also id. at 269 (Black, J., dissenting) ("To-
day's case degrades First Amendment freedoms to the 'rational basis' level."). Justice Jackson went to
some lengths in his dissent to embrace Holmes's suggestion in Gitlow that the limits the fourteenth
amendment imposed on state restrictions of speech might be less stringent than those the first amend-
ment imposed on the United States. Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 287-95 (Jackson, J., dissenting). See
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting). For criticism of this conclu-
sion, see H. KALVEN, supra note 127, at 33-34.
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D. The Witch Hunt
A distressing series of decisions upholding measures designed to protect
against subversion revealed the full extent of the retreat. World War II
had produced its share of questionable limitations on freedom,""1 but re-
strictions of speech and assembly had not figured prominently among
them. Any inference that this was attributable to the educational value of
earlier wartime excesses,1"2 however, was rudely dispelled by a rising tide
of repressive legislation once the crisis was past. Soviet Russia, our former
ally, was now perceived as working actively to undermine our govern-
ment. Communists were imagined under every bed, and Senator Joe Mc-
Carthy was the man of the hour. 33
1. Dennis v. United States
"[S]elf-preservation," wrote Justice Frankfurter, "is the most pervasive
aspect of sovereignty." ' 4 Obviously, said the Chief Justice, Congress can
"protect the Government of the United States from armed rebellion."1 ' It
followed, for six of the eight participating Justices, that leaders of the
Communist Party could be jailed under the Smith Act"' 6 for conspiring to
"organize" a society to "advocate" the violent overthrow of the
government.13
There was no doubt that the Smith Act served a compelling governmen-
tal interest. The question, as Vinson noted, was whether the statute was
an appropriate means for achieving that goal. 3 ' Congress had not been
content to forbid only rebellion itself, or even its incitement; conspiring to
organize persons to advocate overthrow was three steps removed from the
131 See generally Stone I, supra note 1, passim.
131 See White, supra note 1, at 1145-55 (discussing the World War I Espionage Act cases).
133 See generally R. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 196 (1960) ("Growing
national awareness of the totalitarian threat in the years after 1945 generated a national mood toward
'subversion' that sometimes approached hysteria"); Emerson & Helfeld, Loyalty among Government
Employees, 58 YALE L.J. 1 (1948); O'Brian, Loyalty Tests and Guilt by Association, 61 HARv. L.
REV. 592 (1948).
"a, Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 519 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
235 Id. at 501 (opinion of Vinson, C.J.).
136 18 U.S.C. §§ 2385, 2387 (1982).
131 See 341 U.S. at 496-97. Justice Clark, who had previously been in charge of Smith Act
prosecutions as Attorney General, did not sit. Id. at 517.
188 Id. at 501.
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substantive crime.
The Whitney and Gitlow opinions of the 1920s,139 which went far to
sustain the statute, had been discredited.14 Yet the case for conviction in
Dennis, Frankfurter rightly observed, was much stronger. It would re-
quire "excessive tolerance of the legislative judgment" to believe that what
Holmes had referred to as the "puny anonymities" in Gitlow "could jus-
tify serious concern. In Frankfurter's view, however, Congress could
reasonably have found that a tightly organized party of 60,000 members
with subversive goals posed "a substantial danger to national security. 1 42
Douglas and Black protested that there was no clear and present dan-
ger of rebellion. 4" Professing to accept this test, Vinson seemed to read
out of it the requirement that the danger be "present." "Obviously, the
words cannot mean that . .. the Government . ..must wait until the
putsch is about to be executed ...., The Chief Justice thus ignored
Brandeis's appealing explanation that suppression was impermissible
while there was time for discussion. 145 Jackson insisted that the first
amendment did not forbid punishment of conspiracy, 146 giving no weight
to the fact that the conspiracy charged was one not to overthrow the gov-
ernment, but to organize a group to advocate its overthrow. If the associa-
tion itself could not be punished, focusing on the more remote conspiracy
"' Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); see
generally Taft, supra note 1, at 82-91 (discussing Gitlow and Whitney).
"0 See 341 U.S. at 507 (Vinson, C.J.) (noting that later decisions had "inclined toward" the
views expressed by Justices Holmes and Brandeis in separate opinions). Justice Frankfurter, in his
concurring opinion, stated that "it would be disingenuous to deny that the dissent in Gitlow has been
treated with the respect usually accorded to a decision." Id. at 541 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
145 341 U.S. at 541.
142 Id. at 547. See also id. at 510 (Vinson, C.J.) ("The situation with which Justices Holmes
and Brandeis were concerned in Gitlow was a comparatively isolated event, bearing little relation, in
their minds, to any substantial threat to the safety of the community."). See Meiklejohn, What Does
the First Amendment Mean?, 20 U. CHI. L. REv. 461 (1953) (sharply criticizing Justice Frank-
furter's opinion).
143 341 U.S. at 579 (Black, J., dissenting); 341 U.S. at 581 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
144 Id. at 509. See Frank, The United States Supreme Court: 1950-51, 19 U. CHI. L. REv. 165,
189-90 (1952) ("[T]he Vinson opinion claims a lineage from Holmes and Brandeis which it does not
have. The voice is Jacob's voice, but the hands are the hands of Esau.") (footnote omitted).
145 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376-77 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (quoted in
Dennis, 341 U.S. at 585-86 (Douglas, J., dissenting)). For a reply to the argument that application of
the clear-and-present-danger test would leave the government powerless to protect itself, see Nathan-
son, The Communist Trial and the Clear-and-Present-Danger Test, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1167 (1950).
146 341 U.S. at 561-79 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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should not have made conviction any easier. Frankfurter's argument that
it was basically up to Congress to determine the limits of its own power147
seemed to confirm the impression left by his dissent in West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette that he took a dim view of judicial review
in general. 4 As John Marshall had said, the Framers did not mean to
leave the fox in charge of the chickens. 14
9
Vinson spoke for four Justices. Despite the contrary views of Frank-
furter and Jackson, clear and present danger had become the test of con-
victions even under statutes specifically directed to subversive speech, 5'
but it had lost its protective power.1 51
2. The Privilege Doctrine
Self-preservation efforts were not restricted to criminal penalties. Sus-
pect organizations were blacklisted by the Attorney General; their mem-
bers were excluded from government jobs, from union offices, and even -
if they were aliens - from the country itself. The Supreme Court went
along with most of this, but in the last of such cases during the Vinson
period it firmly drew the line.
The tale begins with cases having nothing to do with subversion. In a
notorious opinion for the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Jus-
tice Holmes had denied that the dismissal of a police officer for political
activity raised any freedom of expression question because there was "no
constitutional right to be a policeman." '152 The Supreme Court had al-
ready recognized, however, that to condition the grant of such a "privi-
lege" on surrender of a constitutional right could effectively abridge the
right itself. Thus, a foreign corporation could not be required to surrender
its right to litigate in federal court or to submit to otherwise unconstitu-
147 Id. at 525-27, 550-52 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
148 West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 646-71 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dis-
senting). See also Stone II, supra note 1, at 53-55.
'"" See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803). See geneially D. CURRIE,
supra note 1, at 66-74.
150 Compare Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 670-71 (1925) with Dennis v. United States,
341 U.S. at 516-17.
I51 See R. McCLosKEY, supra note 133, at 197; Mendelson, Clear and Present Danger -
from Schenck to Dennis, 52 COLUM. L. REv. 313, 330 (1952) ("The remoteness element ... is the
heart of the danger test .... ").
"' McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (1892).
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tional taxation or regulation as a condition of doing business within a
state.' 53 Similarly, when the Vinson Court, by a 4-3 vote in United Public
Workers v. Mitchell' upheld the Hatch Act's 55 drastic limitation of the
political activity of civil-service employees, it did not rest on the ground
that there was no right to government employment.-Acknowledging that
Congress could not exclude Republicans or practicing Catholics from fed-
eral jobs, Justice Reed frankly, if deferentially, found the restriction justi-
fied by the government's interest in keeping politics out of the civil
service. 56
Consequently, when in 1950 the Justices in American Communications
Association v. Douds57 passed upon a Taft-Hartley Act provision deny-
ing access to the National Labor Relations Board to unions whose officers
declined to swear they were not Communists,' Chief Justice Vinson did
not simply brand access to the Board as a "privilege" that could be denied
or limited at will.'59 Rather, he set forth an exemplary framework for
determining when conditioning government benefits on surrender of a
1' Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 594 (1926); Western Union
Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1, 34-38 (1910); Insurance Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445
(1874); D. CURRIE, supra note 1, at 413 n.74; Fuller I, supra note 1, at 377 n.315; Taft, supra note
1, at 79 n.80. Justice Holmes never seemed to get the point; he dissented in both Western Union, 216
U.S. at 52-56, and Frost, 271 U.S. at 600-02.
330 U.S. 75 (1947).
155 5 U.S.C. §§ 7324-7327 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
256 330 U.S. 75, 94-104 (1947); cf. Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371 (1881) (upholding ban on one
civil servant's acceptance of political contribution from another). See generally D. CURtRIE, supra note
1, at 443-44. Justices Black and Douglas, dissenting in Mitchell, seemed correct in asserting that to
deny such fundamental rights to public workers was an extreme means of protecting them from pres-
sure from their superiors. 330 U.S. at 105-15 (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 115-26 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (also criticizing the Court for concluding that employees who had not yet violated the Act
had no standing to challenge it and arguing convincingly that the risk of prosecution for activities they
would otherwise engage in created an actual controversy within the meaning of Article III). Other-
wise, as Professor Borchard had argued, "the only way to determine whether the suspect is a mush-
room or a toadstool is to eat it" - scarcely an acceptable course in a "civilized legal system."
Borchard, The Constitutionality of Declaratory Judgments, 31 COLUM. L. REv. 561, 585-89 (1931).
See generally Taft, supra note 1, at 129-31 (discussing earlier decisions respecting anticipatory relief).
1- 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
151 See generally Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional
Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968); Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1595
(1960) (both tracing the development of limits on the "privilege" doctrine).
"' Indeed Vinson acknowledged that the provision limited some interests that could not fairly be
characterized as privileges, such as the right to enter into union shop contracts or engage in certain
strikes or boycotts. Douds, 339 U.S. at 389-90 & n.6.
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constitutional right should be treated as a denial of the right itself.100
"Men who hold union offices," wrote Vinson, "often have little choice
[under the Act] but to renounce Communism or give up their offices." 6'
"By exerting pressures on unions to deny office to Communists . . . [the
statute] has the ... necessary effect of discouraging the exercise of politi-
cal rights protected by the First Amendment"' 62 - for not even in Dennis
would the Court say it could be made a crime simply to be a member of
the Communist Party.
To Justice Black this was enough to make the oath requirement uncon-
stitutional." 3 Vinson was correct, however, that the government need not
open all its doors to everyone it cannot put behind bars. On the one hand,
the effect of the oath provision on protected conduct was less severe than
that of a criminal prohibition. The statute "touches only a relative hand-
ful of persons ... [a]nd it leaves those few who are affected free to main-
tain their affiliations ... subject only to possible loss of positions."'' 64 On
the other hand, the government's interest was greater because union of-
ficers were in a unique position to precipitate crippling political strikes.' 65
Greater restrictions might be placed on "a general with five hundred
thousand men at his command" than on the "village constable."' 66 The
first amendment requires that one "be permitted to believe what he will"
and usually to advocate it, but not "to be the keeper of the arsenal.'
167
160 Id. at 382, 393-412 (1950).
181 Id. at 393.
162 Id.
161 Id. at 445-53 (Black, J., dissenting). Justices Douglas, Clark, and Minton did not partici-
pate. See id. at 415.
16 Id. at 404.
165 Id. at 391.
166 Id. at 409.
167 Id. at 412. "[T]he problem," said Vinson, "is one of weighing the probable effects of the
statute upon the free exercise of the right of speech and assembly against the congressional determina-
tion . . . that Communists . . . pose continuing threats to thte] public interest when in positions of
union leadership." Id. at 400. In citing for this test a decision dealing with content-neutral regulation
of the time, place, or manner of speaking, Chief Justice Vinson seemed to make it easier than it
should have been to uphold the restriction; for even an indirect burden laid only upon those professing
a particular point of view has a more distorting effect on public debate than any neutral limitation.
See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939) (handbilling prohibition). See generally Stone, Con-
tent Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 189 (1983) (supporting a
sharp distinction between content-based and content-neutral restrictions on expression). Nevertheless,
Professor McCloskey's conclusion that Vinson's opinion "suggested ... that Congress could use the
commerce power to interfere with free speech and association without fear of constitutional hin-
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That the balance of interests was more favorable to a measure limited
to union officers than to a general prohibition, however, did not compel
Vinson's conclusion that the Taft-Hartley provision was constitutional.
The statute swept quite broadly, disqualifying unions whose officers were
Communist Party members regardless of whether they shared or even
knew of the Party's goals. As the Court would soon recognize, mere party
membership may be entirely innocent. The statute seemed to limit the
liberty of far more persons than was necessary to protect commerce from
interruption. 6 "
Three cases decided soon after Douds followed its implications by up-
holding various measures designed to exclude subversives from candidacy
for public office, from municipal employment, and from teaching in public
schools.' In 1952 the majority went so far as to permit the deportation of
long-time resident aliens for mere membership in the Communist Party in
the distant past.'7 0 In the meantime, however, four of eight participating
Justices had found constitutional defects in the Attorney General's black-
listing of "subversive" organizations.' In Wieman v. Updegraff, decided
drance" seems to overstate the point. R. MCCLOSKEY, supra note 133, at 197.
163 Frankfurter and Jackson joined Black in objecting to the additional requirement that union
officers swear that they did not "believe in ...the overthrow of the United States Government by
force or by any illegal or unconstitutional methods." See 339 U.S. at 419-22 (Frankfurter, J., dissent-
ing in part); 339 U.S. at 435-44 (Jackson, J., dissenting in part). Since Justices Douglas, Minton,
and Clark did not participate, the Court was equally divided on this issue. See id. at 415.
... Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 492, 494 & n.8 (1952) (Minton, J.) (upholding
provision construed to require dismissal of teachers for knowing membership in an organization advo-
cating the violent overthrow of the government); Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716, 723-
24 (1951) (Clark, J., over four dissents) (upholding a provision understood to require that municipal
employees swear that they did not advocate and were not knowing members of a group that advocated
such overthrow); Gerende v. Board of Supervisors, 341 U.S. 56, 56-57 (1951) (per curiam) (unani-
mously upholding a requirement that a candidate swear he was not engaged "'in the attempt to
overthrow the government by force or violence' ") (quoting Shub v. Simpson, 196 Md. 177, 192, 76
A.2d 332, 338 (1950)) (emphasis in original).
Justices Black and Douglas dissented on the merits in Adler, 342 U.S. at 496-97 (Black, J., dis-
senting); id. at 508-11 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Frankfurter powerfully argued that the plaintiffs
lacked standing. "These teachers do not allege that they have engaged in proscribed conduct or that
they have any intention to do so." Id. at 504. In upholding a further requirement that public employ-
ees disclose whether they were or had been members of the Communist Party, Garner gave a fore-
taste of the great controversies over legislative investigations that would occupy the Justices after the
appointment of Vinson's successor. Garner, 341 U.S. at 720.
170 Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 581, 591-92 (1952) (Jackson, J.).
171 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951). Justices Black, id. at
142-149, Frankfurter, id. at 160-74, Douglas, id. at 174-83, and Jackson, id. at 186-87, all found a
HeinOnline  -- 37 Emory L. J. 275 1988
EMORY LAW JOURNAL
just a few months before Vinson's death, the Court unanimously found
the limit.1
2
Oklahoma had denied public employment to anyone unwilling to swear
that he was not a member of any organization on the Attorney General's
list.17 3 Without once again facing the divisive issues surrounding the list
itself, the Court distinguished its earlier public employment decisions on
the ground that the restrictions upheld in those cases had all been read to
apply only to those who participated knowingly in proscribed organiza-
tions or personally sought to destroy the government by force. 17 4 Mere
membership in a subversive organization could not be made conclusive.1 5
Thus the Oklahoma provision excluded too many innocent persons.1 76
This was true enough, though it distinguished neither Douds nor the
deportation case. Nevertheless, the Court seemed to have changed its tone
if not its tune; individual responsibility had not been stressed much in the
schoolteacher decision. Repeated exposure to provisions of this sort and to
press reports of witch hunting seemed to have heightened the Court's
awareness of the dangers that unbridled concern for national security held
for first amendment freedoms.1
denial of procedural due process. Black added first amendment and bill of attainder arguments as
well. Id. at 143-46. Burton concurred on nonconstitutional grounds. Id. at 124-42. Reed, joined by
Vinson and Minton, voted to uphold the order. Id. at 199-213; Clark, who as Attorney General had
promulgated the challenged list, did not vote. Id. at 142.
172 344 U.S. 183 (1952) (Clark, J.). Justice Burton concurred only in the result. Justice Jackson
did not participate. See id. at 192.
173 344 U.S. at 186-87.
174 Id. at 188-89.
175 Id. at 190 ("A state servant may have joined a proscribed organization unaware of its activi-
ties and purposes.").
176 See id. at 191 ("Indiscriminate classification of innocent with knowing activity must fall as an
assertion of arbitrary power."). The opinion did not explicitly mention freedom of speech or assembly,
concluding only that "[t]he oath offends due process." Id. Professor Van Alstyne considers Wieman
based essentially upon the concept of equality, although the Equal Protection Clause was nowhere
mentioned. Van Alstyne, supra note 158, at 1454-55. Cf Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268
(1951).
177 See Kalven, Upon Rereading Mr. Justice Black on the First Amendment, 14 U.C.L.A. L.
REv. 428, 438 (1967) (describing Wieman as "an impressive victory at a time when few anti-subver-
sive measures were being found wanting").
[Vol. 37
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III. EQUALITY AND PROCESS
A. Race
As I have elsewhere discussed, the Vinson Court put the final kibosh on
the exclusion of blacks from primary elections in Terry v. Adams in
1953.17'8 This decision was as predictable as it was creative, for the period
had begun as it ended in Terry - with a bold decision holding the state
responsible for discrimination by persons with no official governmental
power.
Shelley v. Kraemer involved two suits to enjoin violations of restrictive
covenants forbidding the occupancy of land by persons not of "the Cauca-
sian race."' 179 Without dissent, the Supreme Court set the injunctions
aside on the ground that they denied black purchasers equal protection of
the laws.""
Because the equal protection clause limits only the states, Vinson con-
ceded that the private agreements not to permit black occupancy were not
themselves unconstitutional.18' In Shelley, however, the property owners
had been willing to disobey their agreements; "but for the active interven-
tion of the state courts, supported by the full panoply of state power, peti-
tioners would have been free to occupy the properties in question."' 82
Ever since the jury discrimination cases of 1880 it had been clear that the
fourteenth amendment limited state judicial as well as legislative action;.83
and that, said Vinson, was that.'8 4
178 345 U.S. 461 (1953). See also Stone HI, supra note 1, at 58-61 (discussing Terry in connec-
tion with earlier white-primary decisions).
.79 334 U.S. 1, 4-7 (1948).
... Reed, Jackson, and Rutledge did not participate. 334 U.S. at 23.
.81 Id. at 13 (citing Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926)).
182 Id. at 19.
183 Id. at 14-18 (citing, e.g., Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1880)); see also D. CURRIE,
supra note 1, at 385-86 (discussing Rives and Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 347 (1880) (Strong,
J.) (equal protection clause forbids judicial and executive officers from excluding blacks from juries)).
184 For approving views see Ming, Racial Restrictions and the Fourteenth Amendment: The
Restrictive Covenant Cases, 16 U. CHI. L. REV. 203, 214 (1949); Frank, The United States Supreme
Court: 1947-48, 16 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 23 (1948) [hereinafter Frank, 1947-48] ("[I]t would have
been hair-splitting indeed to say that a state may do through its courts what it may not do through its
legislature.").
In a companion case from the District of Columbia, the Court reached the same result on statutory
and public-policy grounds without reaching the question whether the fifth amendment's due process
clause imposed limitations on Congress similar to those the equal protection clause imposed on the
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Of course, as the Court so laboriously demonstrated, there had been
state action. The serious question was whether that action had denied
equal protection of the laws.185 The parties to the covenants, not the state,
had made the decision to discriminate on racial grounds. The state's policy
was the racially neutral one of enforcing private agreements. The decision
appeared to mean the police could no longer enforce a householder's deci-
sion to invite only whites to his cocktail party. 8 ' It rings hollow to pro-
claim private rights while denying the state's power to protect them; Shel-
ley seemed to deprive the constitutional distinction between public and
private action of much of its significance.1 "
In other cases of the period, the Court continued to insist that separate
schooling for blacks in fact be equal.1 "8 A crucial passage in Shelley, how-
ever, seemed to foretell the demise of racial segregation itself. It was im-
material, Vinson argued, whether the states would enforce racial cove-
states. Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948) (Vinson, C.J.); cf. Stone I, supra note 1, at 9-20 (discuss-
ing the Japanese-American cases).
185 See Henkin, Shelley v. Kramer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 481
(1962).
188 See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 29
(1959). Earnest efforts have been made to limit Shelley to cases in which the state assists individuals
in coercing third parties, Pollak, Racial Discrimination andJudicial Integrity, 108 U. PA. L. REV.
1, 13 (1959), or is not constitutionally barred from interfering with the private discriminatory deci-
sion, Henkin, supra note 185, at 498. Neither of these arguments answers the basic objection that the
state's position was racially neutral in Shelley; and neither explains how the state can be said to be
any more responsible for the private decision in one case than in the other. Analytically more attrac-
tive is the effort in Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 1083, 1115-16 (1960),
which assimilates Shelley to the white-primary cases, supra note 178, by arguing that private cove-
nants were a private exercise of the public function of zoning. This ordinary use of private ordering,
however, seems a far cry from control of the machinery for choosing state officials or from the compre-
hensive exercise of governmental functions by the company town in Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501
(1946). See also Stone II, supra note 1, at 58-61.
18 When Shelley was applied to forbid the grant of damages for violation of a racial covenant in
Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953) (Minton, J.), Vinson dissented alone, 346 U.S. at 260-69,
although on the crucial issue of state action the cases seemed indistinguishable. More interesting was
the Court's conclusion in Barrows, 346 U.S. at 254-59, that a white seller being sued for violating the
covenant had standing to assert the constitutional rights of black purchasers. The general principle
that even injured parties may assert only their own rights was a judicially developed "rule of self-
restraint," not a constitutional requirement; and it should be relaxed in Barrows because in such a
case "it would be difficult if not impossible for those persons whose rights are asserted to present their
grievance before any court." Id. at 257.
's McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (Vinson, C.J.); Sweatt v.
Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (Vinson, C.J.); Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948) (per
curiam).
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nants that excluded whites as well as those directed against blacks. "The
rights created by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment are, by its
terms, guaranteed to the individual .... It is, therefore, no answer to these
petitioners to say that the courts may also be induced to deny white per-
sons rights of ownership and occupancy on grounds of race or color.
Equal protection of the laws is not achieved through indiscriminate impo-
sition of inequalities." '189
Two wrongs, in other words, do not make a right; both whites and
blacks are denied equal protection if each is denied what the other re-
ceives. Brown v. Board of Education, held over for reargument, was not
decided until after Vinson's death; 90 but the Justices would have some
explaining to do if the separate-but-equal doctrine was to survive.
B. Other Classifications
As early as 1915 the Court had held that equal protection precluded the
state from limiting the number of aliens a willing employer could hire.191
In 1948 it added that aliens could not be excluded from commercial fish-
ing."19 A few months earlier the Court had even made a substantial dent
in the oppressive alien land laws it had unhesitatingly upheld in earlier
189 334 U.S. at 22. See also Roche, Education, Segregation and the Supreme Court - A Politi-
cal Analysis, 99 U. PA. L. REv. 949, 952 (1951) (finding similar significance in a passage from
Sweatt v. Painter. "The Chief Justice stated in so many words that separate legal education cannot
be equal . ... ") (emphasis in original).
190 345 U.S. 972 (1953). The Court had earlier taken the unusual step of inviting petitions for
certiorari before a decision had been rendered in a case pending before the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia. That case raised the same question under the due process clause of the fifth
amendment. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 344 U.S. 1, 3 (1952) (per curiam).
191 Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915). See White, supra note 1, at 1137 n.140 (discussing
Truax).
192 Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948) (Black, J.). Black wrote for the
majority over a dissent by Justice Reed; 334 U.S. at 427-31. Cf Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385,
395-403 (1948) (Vinson, C.J.) (reaching the same conclusion as to citizens of other states under the
more explicit privileges and immunities clause of article IV).
The law struck down in Takahashi applied only to aliens "ineligible to citizenship," 334 U.S. at
418, and thus the case has been argued to present the easier case of racial discrimination against alien
Japanese. Yet the Court's opinion deals basically with the law as if it excluded all aliens, going to
some lengths to refute the state's argument that the limitation to persons ineligible for citizenship
justified an otherwise impermissible discrimination. Takahashi, 334 U.S. at 420. See Rosberg, The
Protection of Aliens from Discriminatory Treatment by the National Government, 1977 Sup. CT.
REv. 275, 297-98; cf Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886); D. CURRIE, supra note 1, at
387.
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years,19 striking down discrimination against a minor citizen who held
paper title on the ground that his father was an alien ineligible for citi-
zenship.1 94 Niemotko v. Maryland employed the equal protection clause
rather than the free exercise clause to strike down religious discrimination
in the issuance of park permits.19 In other respects, however, the Vinson
Court was most unreceptive to arguments that equal protection had been
denied.
Kotch v. Pilot Commissioners upheld a state law prescribing rank nep-
otism in the selection of river pilots; 9" Railway Express Agency v. New
York made only the feeblest effort to explain why it might be reasonable
to exempt an owner's own messages from a ban on advertising on the
exterior of vehicles. 97 MacDougall v. Green summarily dismissed a chal-
lenge to a requirement that new political parties seeking to nominate can-
didates for office obtain petition signatures in at least fifty counties,198
293 See, e.g., Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923); see generally Taft, supra note 1, at 70
(discussing the earlier cases).
'" Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948) (Vinson, C.J.); Justices Reed, Burton, and Jack-
son dissented, 332 U.S. at 674-89, the last objecting that "[i]f California has power to forbid certain
aliens to own its lands, it must have incidental power to prevent evasion of that prohibition by use of
an infant's name to cloak a forbidden ownership." Id. at 684. Justices Black, Douglas, Murphy, and
Rutledge concurred, arguing that the prohibition on alien ownership was itself invalid. Id. at 647-74.
'95 340 U.S. 268, 272-73 (1951) (Vinson, C.J.) (alternative holding).
1986 330 U.S. 552 (1947) (Black, J., with Rutledge, Reed, Douglas, and Murphy, JJ., dissent-
ing). The allegations of the complaint, accepted as true for purposes of a motion to dismiss, were that
only "relatives and friends" of established pilots were accepted into an apprenticeship program that
was a prerequisite to state employment. Id. at 555. Citing "the advantages of early experience under
friendly supervision . . . the benefits to morale and esprit de corps which family and neighborly
tradition might contribute," and "the close association in which pilots must work and live," Justice
Black concluded that the measure was not "unrelated" to the legitimate objective of securing "the
safest and most efficiently operated pilotage system practicable." Id. at 563-64 (emphasis in original).
197 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949) (Douglas, J.) ("The local authorities may well have concluded that
those who advertise their own wares on their trucks do not present the same traffic problem in view of
the nature or extent of the advertising which they use."); cf. 336 U.S. at 114-15 (Jackson, J., concur-
ring) ("There is not even a pretense here that the traffic hazard created by the advertising which is
forbidden is in any manner or degree more hazardous than that which is permitted."). Justice Jackson
also made the interesting argument that the Court should be less deferential in passing upon equal
protection than due process claims because a holding that the state had unconstitutionally discrimi-
nated left it free to reenact the law in more general form. Id. at 111-12. "The framers of the Consti-
tution knew ... that there is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable
government than to require that the principles of law which officials would impose upon a minority
must be imposed generally." Id. at 112.
198 335 U.S. 281, 283 (1948) (per curiam) ("To assume that political power is a function exclu-
sively of numbers is to disregard the practicalities of government"). Justices Douglas, Black, and
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though Carolene Products had suggested that restrictions on the political
process might be subjected to unusually strict scrutiny.1"' Most strikingly,
Goesaert v. Cleary gave the back of the judicial hand to a challenge to the
virtual exclusion of women from bartending.20 The contrast with the
alien cases was striking. Despite the obvious political weakness of foreign-
ers,20 1 one might have thought sex more suspect classification than alien-
age. It seems fair to assume that the citizenship clause of the fourteenth
amendment was meant to confer something of value. 2 '
Murphy dissented. 335 U.S. at 287-91. Justice Rutledge argued, as he had in Colegrove v. Green,
that the short period before the next election made equitable relief improper. 335 U.S. at 284-87. See
Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 564-66 (1946); see also Stone II, supra note 1, at 67-69 (discuss-
ing Colegrove).
199 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); See generally Hughes L
supra note 1, at 554-55 (discussing Carolene Products); see also Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535
(1942); Stone I, supra note I, at 13-14 & n.80 (strict scrutiny of classification affecting "fundamen-
tal" right of reproduction). South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1950) (per curiam, over dissent of Douglas
and Black, JJ.), decided after the deaths of Murphy and Rutledge, refused even to consider the merits
of an equal protection attack on Georgia's county-unit system for statewide elections despite the sys-
tem's obvious departure from equal electoral power for voters in heavily populated counties, saying
only that "[flederal courts consistently refuse to exercise their equity powers in cases posing political
issues arising from a state's geographical distribution of electoral strength among its political subdivi-
sions." 339 U.S. at 277. Cited for this ambiguous conclusion were both McDougall, where the merits
had been reached, and Colegrove, where three of the majority Justices had termed the issue "political"
and the fourth (since deceased) had relied on particular timing problems that the Court did not sug-
gest were present in Peters. See also Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S.
103, 111 (1948) (Jackson, J.). In Waterman, the Court employed political-question terminology to
support the conclusion that the decision whether to allow an airline to operate international flights
was unreviewable, essentially because the matters were committed to the President's discretion. The
opinion also reaffirmed the conclusion of three circuit courts in Hayburn's Case that judicial decisions
could not constitutionally be subjected to executive review. Id. at 113-14. See Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S.
(2 Dall.) 409 (1792); see generally D. CURRIE, supra note 1, at 6-9.
200 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., over a dissent by Rutledge, Douglas, and Murphy,
JJ.). "Michigan could, beyond question, forbid all women from working behind a bar." Id. at 465.
The question actually presented, however, was the constitutionality of an exemption for wives and
daughters of bar owners. Id. The widespread lack of concern over sex discrimination at the time was
exemplified by the observation of John P. Frank, normally a fervent advocate of civil rights and
liberties, that Goesaert "illustrates that equal protection is far indeed from being a serious control over
state economic legislation." Frank, 1948-49, supra note 56, at 26.
"I1 See Rosberg, supra note 192, at 301-08.
202 History indeed suggests that citizens were to be protected generally against state discrimina-
tion under the privileges and immunities clause of the same amendment. The original sense of equal
protection was the narrower one of protection against the wrongs of third parties. See D. CURRIE,
supra note 1, at 342-51 (discussing the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873)). Dis-
senters during the Vinson period revived the related argument that the equal protection clause was
wholly inapplicable to corporations. See Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 576-81
(1949) (Douglas and Black, JJ., dissenting).
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C. Procedure
It was not long after Vinson's appointment, in Adamson v. California,
that Justice Black made his most ambitious effort to establish that the
fourteenth amendment made the entire Bill of Rights applicable to the
states.2 " Though joined by Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge, 0 4 he fell
one vote short. Reaffirming that the privileges and immunities clause pro-
tected only rights "inherent in national citizenship" 205 and due process
only those "'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' ",206 the majority,
in an opinion by Justice Reed, adhered to the conclusion reached in Twin-
ing v. New Jersey that state prosecutors and judges might constitutionally
comment on the refusal of a criminal defendant to take the stand.20
Substantive due process, not surprisingly, enjoyed equally little favor. See, e.g., Day-Brite Lighting
Co. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952) (Douglas, J., over a dissent by Jackson, J.) (upholding require-
ment that employer pay for time-off taken by employee to vote); Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. North-
western Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 536 (1949) (Black, J.) (upholding state right-to-work law):
This Court beginning at least as early as 1934 ... has steadily rejected the due process
philosophy enunciated in the Adair-Coppage line of cases. In doing so it has consciously
returned closer and closer to the earlier constitutional principle that states have power to
legislate against what are found to be injurious practices in their internal commercial and
business affairs, so long as their laws do not run afoul of some specific federal constitu-
tional prohibition, or of some valid federal law.
Id. at 536.
Even the explicit guarantee of compensation for a federal taking of property was read narrowly in
United States v. Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149 (1952) (Vinson, C.J.) (allowing an uncompensated de-
struction of property to prevent it from falling into enemy hands during World War II). As Douglas
and Black objected in dissent, the fact that public necessity justified destroying the property meant
only that it could be destroyed with compensation. Id. at 156 (Douglas, J., joined by Black, J., dis-
senting). The fifth amendments basis is that when property must be sacrificed for the common good
"the public purse, rather than the individual, should bear the loss." Id. A better basis for the decision
might have been that, given the presence of the enemy, the value of the property to its owners was
close to zero.
3 332 U.S. 46, 68-123 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). The classic response to Black's thesis is
Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REv. 5
(1949). See also the discussion in Stone II, supra note 1, at 56-57.
204 332 U.S. at 92 (Douglas, J., joining Black's dissent); 332 U.S. at 123-24 (Murphy, J., joined
by Rutledge, J., dissenting). The last two Justices, however, rejected the restrictive aspect of Black's
interpretation, refusing to agree that the due process clause only incorporated the Bill of Rights. Id. at
124.
205 332 U.S. at 53. See D. CURRIE, supra note 1, at 342-51 (discussing the Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873)),
20' 332 U.S. at 54 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 323 (1937)); see also Hughes lI,
supra note 1, at 804 (discussing Palko).
2w "It seems quite natural that when a defendant has opportunity to deny or explain facts and
determines not to do so, the prosecution should bring out the strength of the evidence by commenting
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Two years later, in Wolf v. Colorado, the Court held 6-3 that the four-
teenth amendment did not require a state court to exclude evidence ob-
tained by unreasonable search or seizure.208 "The security of one's privacy
against arbitrary intrusion by the police," Justice Frankfurter acknowl-
edged, was "basic to a free society" and thus "enforceable against the
States through the Due Process Clause."2 9 There was room for honest
difference of opinion, however, whether the exclusion of relevant evidence
was an indispensable means of securing it.2"0 "[M]ost of the English-
speaking world" did not so regard it.2"' The great Cardozo, noting that
the exclusionary rule requires "[t]he criminal . . . to go free because the
constable has blundered," had rejected it for New York. 2 Moreover, the
rule perversely served to give greatest protection to "those upon whose
person or premises something incriminating has been found. We cannot,
therefore, regard it as a departure from basic standards" to remit search
victims "to the remedies of private action and such protection as the inter-
nal discipline of the police, under the eyes of an alert public opinion, may
afford."" 3
Black agreed. Even in federal courts the "exclusionary rule is not a
command of the Fourth Amendment but is a judicially created rule of
evidence which Congress might negate." 214 The Justices who had joined
him in Adamson, however, dissented. "Self-scrutiny is a lofty ideal," said
Murphy, but it was visionary to "expect a District Attorney to prosecute
himself or his associates for well-meaning violations of the search and
upon the defendant's failure to explain or deny it." 332 U.S. at 56. See also id. at 60 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) ("Sensible and just-minded men, in important affairs of life, deem it significant that a
man remains silent when confronted with serious and responsible evidence against himself which it is
within his power to contradict."); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908); Friendly, The Fifth
Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REv. 671, 700 (1968).
The fifth amendment itself was narrowly construed to permit the United States to require the
keeping and production of incriminating records, Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948) (Vin-
son, C.J., over four dissents), and the registration of those engaged in illegal gambling, United States
v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 32-33 (1953) (Reed, J., with two dissents on this issue). See generally
Meltzer, Required Records, the McCarran Act, and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 18 U.
Cm. L. REV. 687 (1951).
208 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
209 Id. at 27-28.
210 Id. at 28-29.
211 Id. at 29.
22 Id. at 31. See People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926) (Cardozo, J.).
213 338 U.S. at 31.
211 Id. at 39-40 (Black, J., concurring).
19881
HeinOnline  -- 37 Emory L. J. 283 1988
EMORY LAW JOURNAL
seizure clause .... ,,2"5 Damage actions were beset with so many difficul-
ties - from the requirement of malice to the difficulty of proving physical
harm and the limits of an officer's finances - that they provided a wholly
"illusory" deterrent. 216 As the Court had said in announcing the exclu-
sionary rule for federal prosecutions in Weeks v. United States, if evidence
unlawfully seized could be introduced at trial, " 'the Fourth Amend-
ment ... might as well be stricken from the Constitution.' "21
Wolf notwithstanding, it was Justice Frankfurter who concluded for a
unanimous Court in the 1952 case of Rochin v. California that due pro-
cess forbade a state court to consider evidence obtained by pumping the
defendant's stomach against his will.218 Defensively insisting that the
"vague contours" of the prevailing criteria did not "make due process of
law a matter of judicial caprice,' 21 9 Frankfurter concluded that the con-
duct of the police in Rochin "shocks the conscience. "220 "[T]o sanction
th[is] brutal conduct ...would be to afford brutality the cloak of law.
Nothing would be more calculated to discredit law and thereby to brutal-
ize the temper of a society.1
22
This was all very persuasive, but it seemed equally applicable to Wolf,
where Frankfurter had reached the opposite conclusion. That pumping
the defendant's stomach was "shocking" only made it, like any other un-
reasonable search, unconstitutional. That was not enough, Wolf had held,
to forbid introducing its fruits as evidence; "[h]ow such arbitrary conduct
should be checked was up to the states. "222 Frankfurter's argument that
:15 Id. at 42 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
218 Id. at 42-44 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
217 Id. at 42 (quoting Weeks, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914)). See also 338 U.S. at 40-41 (Douglas,
J., dissenting); id. at 47-48 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). For agreement with the dissenters, see Allen,
The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism, and the Civil Liberties, 45 ILL. L. REV. 1 (1950);
Frank, 1948-49, supra note 56, at 32 ("The parade was magnificent, but the enemy remained
unscathed.").
218 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
219 Id. at 170-72.
220 Id. at 172.
221 342 U.S. at 173-74. Black and Douglas concurred, proffering an unconvincing self-incrimina-
tion argument even though the Court had long since made clear that the purposes of the fifth-amend-
ment provision applied only to testimonial compulsion. Id. at 174-75 (Black, J., concurring); see also
id. at 177-79 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justices Murphy and Rutledge were no longer on the Court.
See Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252-53 (1910); see generally White, supra note 1, at 1155
n.227.
222 Wolf, 338 U.S. at 28.
[Vol. 37
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the numerous decisions excluding coerced confessions were not based
solely upon their unreliability only accentuated the tension.223 If confes-
sions had to be excluded whenever the methods by which they were ob-
tained "offend[ed] the community's sense of fair play and decency,"224 it
seemed to follow that the fruits of an unreasonable search should be ex-
cluded too. 25
As a result of the expansive decisions of the 1930s, the docket was in-
creasingly swollen with other criminal cases, most of which raised only
factual questions of no general interest. Shortly before Vinson's death, the
Justices took a meat ax to the habeas corpus statute in an effort to relieve
themselves of the burden.226
223 342 U.S. at 172-73 (citing, inter alia, Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936)); see gener-
ally Hughes II, supra note 1, at 803-05 (discussing Brown).
224 342 U.S. at 173.
221 See Allen, Due Process and State Criminal Procedures: Another Look, 48 Nw. U.L. REV.
16, 26-27 (1953); Perlman, Due Process and the Admissibility of Evidence, 64 HARV. L. REV. 1304,
1308-11 (1951). Equally difficult to reconcile with Rochin was the unanimous decision in Frisbie v.
Collins, reaffirming that the kidnapping of a defendant by state officers was no ground for voiding his
conviction. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522 (1952) (Black, J.) (reaffirming Ker v. Illinois, 119
U.S. 436, 444 (1886)). See Allen, supra note 225, at 27-28.
226 See, e.g., Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953) (permitting federal court on habeas corpus to
reexamine nonjurisdictional issues decided by state court); Hart, The Time Chart of the Justices, 73
HARV. L. REV. 84 (1959) (tracing evolution of Court's habeas corpus jurisdiction with emphasis on
Brown).
Among the more interesting procedural decisions of the Vinson era in non-criminal matters were
United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950) (Minton, J.) (holding that an alien
could be denied entry into the United States without a hearing if admission would be prejudicial to
the interests of the United States), and Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206
(1953) (Clark, J.) (allowing indefinite detention of an alien without a hearing at the discretion of the
Attorney General on a confidential finding that entry would be prejudicial to the security of the
United States).
The basis for these conclusions seemed to be that the admission of aliens was a "privilege" rather
than a "right." Knauff, 338 U.S. at 542. Thus, the aliens' admission was apparently neither "liberty"
nor "property" under the due process clause. As Jackson observed in a dissent in Mezei, it was hard
to deny that a person confined to Ellis Island had been deprived of liberty. 345 U.S. at 220-21 (Jack-
son, J., joined by Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Justices Black and Douglas also dissented. 345 U.S. at
216-18. Contrast the solicitude shown by the Court during the same period for resident aliens sub-
jected to discriminatory treatment by state law. See supra text accompanying notes 191-94; see also
the criticism of Knauff and Mezei in Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A
Century of Chinese Exclusion and its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 858-63 (1987).
At the same time, limiting its earlier distressing conclusion that personal jurisdiction over the de-
fendant was not necessary in divorce cases, see Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942)
(Stone If, supra note 1, at 66-67), the Justices held that a court without personal jurisdiction could
not cut off a spouse's right to alimony, Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948) (Douglas, J.), or to
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IV. THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE
On April 5, 1952, at the height of the Korean War, the Steelworkers'
Union gave notice of a nationwide strike. Three days later, to assure con-
tinued production of essential war materials, President Truman directed
the Secretary of Commerce to take possession of the steel mills. In
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company v. Sawyer, the Supreme Court held
that he had acted beyond his power.227
Four of the six Justices in the majority concluded that Congress had
forbidden the seizure. An amendment to the Taft-Hartley Act that would
have authorized seizure in national emergency cases had been rejected in
favor of a provision for enjoining the strike itself. "The authoritatively
expressed purpose of Congress to disallow such power to the President,"
said Justice Frankfurter, "could not be more decisive if it had been writ-
ten into . . . the Labor Management Relations Act." 221
custody, May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953) (Burton, J.). The Court exhibited less regard for the
interests of the parties' home state than for those of the parties themselves, holding that the appear-
ance of the defendant precluded a collateral attack on a divorce judgment, even by third parties, for
lack of domicile. Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S. 126 (1951) (Douglas, J.); Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S.
581 (1951) (Reed, J.); Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948) (Vinson, C.J.). See generally Currie,
Suitcase Divorce in the Conflict of Laws: Simons, Rosenstiel, and Borax, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 26
(1966) (exploring the problems of ex parte and collusive divorce proceedings).
The Court deviated from the general trend toward permitting any interested state to apply its own
law to decide a controversy when it held that the full faith and credit clause required a policyholder's
state to defer to the law of the state of incorporation in determining the validity of a clause in a
fraternal insurance policy limiting the time for suit. Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe,
331 U.S. 586 (1947) (Burton, J., over four dissents); see also Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951)
(Black, J.) (holding that state where both parties resided could not refuse to entertain a wrongful
death action based on law of the place of the wrong but stressing that the forum had not attempted to
apply its own law). See generally B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 253-
58, 283-311 (1963); Stone II, supra note 1, at 64-66; Hughes I, supra note 1, at 549-53; Harper, The
Supreme Court and the Conflict of Laws, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 883, 895-900 (1947); Reese, Full
Faith and Credit to Statutes: The Defense of Public Policy, 19 U. CI. L. REv. 339 (1952).
227 343 U.S. 579, 582-83 (1952). For background, see M. MARCUS, TRUMAN AND THE STEEL
SEIZURE CASE (1977).
228 343 U.S. at 602 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see also id. at 634, 639 (Jackson, J., concur-
ring) ("Congress has not left seizure of private property an open field but has covered it by three
statutory policies inconsistent with this seizure."); id. at 655, 660 (Burton, J., concurring) ("Congress
... has prescribed for the President specific procedures, exclusive of seizure, for ...meeting the
present type of emergency."); id. at 660, 662 (Clark, J., concurring in the judgment) ("where Con-
gress has laid down specific procedures to deal with the type of crisis confronting the President, he
must follow those procedures"). For approving views of this line of reasoning see Corwin, The Steel
Seizure Case: A Judicial Brick without Straw, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 53, 65 (1953); Kauper, The Steel
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It may have been stretching things to find a prohibition in mere failure
to authorize seizure, but Justice Jackson was correct that the President's
power is "at its lowest ebb" when he acts contrary to "the expressed or
implied will of Congress."22 Although the Constitution grants the Presi-
dent authority that Congress.cannot take from him,230 no one denied that
Congress could limit any Presidential power to seize private property.231
Article II's command that the President "take care that the laws be faith-
fully executed" and Article VI's designation of federal statutes as "su-
preme law of the land" confirm the implication that the laws which Arti-
cle I empowers Congress to enact bind the President as well as everyone
else.232
Justice Black's "opinion of the Court," however, took a broader ap-
proach. No statute, he wrote, justified the President's action; his authority
Seizure Case: Congress, the President, and the Supreme Court, 51 MICH. L. REV. 141, 180 (1952).
229 343 U.S. at 637. Other decisions of the Vinson period tended to confirm Jackson's converse
principle that executive power "is at its maximum" when exercised in accordance with congressional
authorization. See, e.g., Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 784-86 (1948) (Burton, J.) (invoking
the purpose and "factual background" of the statute (including practice under prior legislation) to
supply adequate standards for the recovery of "excessive profits" from government contractors); Fahey
v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 250 (1947) (Jackson, J.) (upholding delegation of authority to appoint
conservators for failing banks because the "accumulated experience of supervisors" acting under state
law had "established well-defined practices" to guide the executive decision); United States ex rel.
Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542-43 (1950) (upholding authorization to exclude alien whose
entry, as characterized by the United States Attorney General, "would be prejudicial to the interests
of the United States" because the right to exclude aliens "is inherent in the executive power to control
... foreign affairs"). Cf United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) (up-
holding congressional delegation of foreign policy matter to the President); see generally Hughes I,
supra note 1, at 518 n.72 (discussing Curtiss-Wright).
210 Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 139-40 (1866) (Chase, C.J., concurring). See gener-
ally W. TAFT, OUR CHIEF MAGISTRATE AND HIS POWERS 128-29 (1916); D. CURRIE, supra note
1, at 292 n.31 (discussing Milligan).
231 See Youngstown Steel & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 643 (Jackson, J., concurring)
(stressing that Article I empowered Congress "to raise and support armies" and "to provide and
maintain a navy"); id. at 660-61 (Clark, J., concurring) (quoting Little v. Barreme (The Flying Fish),
6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804) (enforcing congressional limitation on seizure of vessels to enforce laws
against trading with French ports). See also U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 18 ("The Congress shall have
power ... To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the
foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United
States, or in any department or officer thereof.").
232 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 154-62 (1803) (emphasizing the executive's
amenability to congressional enactments by concluding that an Act of Congress required the Secretary
of State to deliver Marbury's commission).
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as Commander-in-Chief did not reach so far;233 and the order could not
be sustained on the basis of the
several constitutional provisions that grant executive power to the
President . . . [T]he President's power to see that the laws are
faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker. The
Constitution limits his functions in the lawmaking process to the
recommending of laws he thinks wise and the vetoing of laws he
thinks bad. And the Constitution is neither silent nor equivocal
about who shall make laws which the President is to execute.234
In Black's view, more was involved than the President's duty to obey
statutes actually passed by Congress: Apart from the Constitution's own
grants of authority over foreign affairs and the armed forces, the President
may act only on the basis of legislation. Both the grant of legislative au-
thority to Congress and the enumeration of executive powers suggest this
conclusion, and the history of the Constitution supports it. Congress was
empowered to raise and support armies, for example, so that the Execu-
tive would not do so.23 5 Jackson added another powerful argument by
juxtaposing the President's duty to execute the laws with an early under-
standing of the due process clause. ".One [provision] gives a governmental
authority that reaches so far as there is law, the other gives a private right
that authority shall go no farther. These signify about all there is of the
principle that ours is a government of laws, not of men . . 236
21 See also Jackson's concurrence, 343 U.S. at 641-46 (similarly rejecting the argument based
on the President's authority as commander-in-chief).
23 343 U.S. at 587. Justice Clark, concurring in the judgment on the ground that Congress had
forbidden the seizure, expressly disagreed with Black's broader conclusion: "[Tlhe Constitution does
grant to the President extensive authority in times of grave and imperative national emergency." Id. at
662.
" See THSE FEDERALIST Nos. 24, 26, 28 (A. Hamilton); Currie, The Distribution of Powers
After Bowsher, 1986 Sup. CT. REV. 19, 21-26; f. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 644 (Jackson, J., concur-
ring) ("While Congress cannot deprive the President of the command of the army and navy, only
Congress can provide him an army or navy to command."). Justice Douglas made the analogous
argument that a seizure not authorized by statute would undermine the express constitutional require-
ment of a congressional appropriation for the expenditure of federal funds. "The branch of govern-
ment that has the power to pay compensation for a seizure is the only one able to authorize a seizure
." Id. at 631 (Douglas, J., concurring) (referring to U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9).
216 343 U.S. at 646 (Jackson, J., concurring). See also D. CURRIE, supra note 1, at 272 n.268;
Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the Civil War, 24 HARV. L. REv. 366 (1911).
Without commenting on Jackson's use of due process, Professor Corwin criticized Justice Black's
argument as "a purely arbitrary construct created out of hand for the purpose of disposing of this
[Vol. 37
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Chief Justice Vinson, speaking also for Reed and Minton, seemed to
suggest in dissent that the President's authority was not limited to com-
manding the armed forces and executing the laws: Article II gave him the
entire "executive power" of the United States."'7 If Vinson meant to em-
brace the Solicitor General's argument that the President's powers were
not, like those of Congress and the courts, limited by the enumeration that
followed,2"' Jackson had an answer for him. "If that be true, it is difficult
to see why the forefathers bothered to add several specific items, including
some trifling ones."2 ' Although the text of Article II is not as explicit on
this point as are Articles I and III,24 Jackson was aided by evidence of
the framers' purposes in concluding that the vesting of "executive power"
in the President was not "a grant in bulk of all conceivable executive
power," but rather "an allocation to the presidential office of the generic
powers thereafter stated." '241
particular case . . . altogether devoid of historical verification." Corwin, supra note 228, at 64-65.
But see Taft, supra note 230, at 139-47 (taking issue with Theodore Roosevelt's view that the Presi-
dent might "do anything that the needs of the Nation demanded unless such action was forbidden by
the Constitution or by the laws": "The President can exercise no power which cannot be fairly and
reasonably traced to some specific grant of power or justly implied and included within such express
grant as proper and necessary to its exercise."
217 343 U.S. at 681 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting).
118 See id. at 640 (Jackson, J., concurring) (quoting from the Government's brief).
219 Id. at 640-41 (Jackson, J., concurring) (adding that "[t]he example of such unlimited execu-
tive power that must have most impressed the forefathers was the prerogative exercised by George III,
and the description of its evils in the Declaration of Independence leads me to doubt that they were
creating their new Executive in his image"). Id. at 641. See also 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 65-66 (M. Farrand rev. ed. 1937) ("Mr. Wilson ... did not consider the
Prerogatives of the British Monarch as a proper guide in defining the Executive powers .... The
only powers he conceived strictly Executive were those of executing the laws, and appointing
officers .... ); Kauper, supra note 228, at 175-77 (reading Vinson as basing his opinion solely on
the President's authority to execute the laws).
210 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 ("[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States .. "); U.S. CONT. art. III, § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United
States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish."); U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 ("The judicial Power shall extend to
[certain enumerated classes of cases and controversies]"); 7 WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 80
(1951) (arguing that the "different modes of expression in regard to the [exectutive and legislative]
powers confirm the inference that the authority vested in the President is not limited to the specific
cases of executive power delineated in Article II").
241 343 U.S. at 641 (Jackson, J., concurring). See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST Nos. 24, 26, 28 (A.
Hamilton); Corwin, supra note 228, at 53 ("The records of the Constitutional Convention make it
clear that the purposes of this clause were simply to settle the question whether the executive branch
should be plural or single and to give the executive a title.").
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Vinson's principal argument was that, in seizing the steel mills, the
President had acted within his constitutional authority to execute statutes
providing both for military procurement and for combating inflation.
None of these statutes provided explicitly for the seizure of private prop-
erty in order to accomplish their purposes. In Vinson's view, however,
Article II empowered the President to employ all suitable means of en-
forcing the laws that Congress had not forbidden. 4
Past decisions lent some credence to this contention. The Court had
hinted in Little v. Barreme (The Flying Fish) that the President might
have enforced the trade laws by seizure if Congress had been silent;243 In
re Neagle upheld Presidential authority to appoint marshals to protect
federal judges who applied the laws; 244 In re Debs sustained the Presi-
dent's right to seek an injunction against a strike that threatened to inter-
rupt commerce and the mails." Black did not respond to the invocation
of these precedents. Even if one concedes that the President may not be
limited strictly to enforcement methods spelled out by statute, however, a
line must be drawn somewhere if anything is to remain of the principle
that only Congress shall make the laws. 4"
The greater part of Vinson's dissenting opinion was devoted to an am-
bitious effort to demonstrate a historical understanding that the President
might take emergency action without express statutory authority.247 While
Black rightly protested that one violation of the Constitution cannot justify
another,248  Frankfurter appropriately acknowledged that long-accepted
242 343 U.S. at 701-02 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting).
23' 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 177-78 (1804) (quoted in Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 660 (Clark, J.,
concurring in the judgment)).
244 135 U.S. 1, 63-68 (1890); see generally Fuller I, supra note 1, at 344 n.117 (discussing
Neagle).
20 158 U.S. 564 (1895); see generally Fuller I, supra note 1, at 343-46 (discussing Debs). In
his dissent Vinson relied on both Neagle and Debs, 343 U.S. at 687-88, 702 (Vinson, C.J., joined by
Reed and Minton, JJ., dissenting).
14 See Kauper, supra note 228, at 150 (denying that the precedents supported a general Presi-
dential "power to implement the legislative policy ... by resorting to measures not embraced within
the remedial and enforcement scheme provided by Congress"). "Perhaps in a time of emergency it
might appear appropriate to conscript manpower for industry, to levy additional taxes to finance the
legislative program, to impose more severe penalties on those who violate the laws. But it would
hardly be contended that presidential prerogative would extend to these areas of legislative authority."
Id. at 181.
217 343 U.S. at 683-700 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting).
218 Id. at 588-89. See also Kauper, supra note 228, at 179 ("[P]rior self-serving assertions of
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practice could establish a "gloss" on the Constitution itself.249 The Court
had often relied on the understanding of other branches to support the
constitutionality of challenged actions. 5
Many of the examples Vinson cited to establish such an understanding,
however, missed the mark. In suppressing the Whiskey Rebellion and in
blockading the Confederacy, Washington and Lincoln had relied on ex-
press statutory authority to use armed force to suppress insurrection.25
Adams's issuance of an extradition warrant served to implement a
treaty.2 52 The Louisiana Purchase was accomplished by treaty under the
explicit terms of Article 11.253 The Emancipation Proclamation was a bat-
tlefield measure of the Commander-in-Chief applying only to slaves be-
hind enemy lines, and Black acknowledged that the President had broad
powers "in a theater of war."254 Even Franklin Roosevelt's dramatic clos-
ing of the banks in 1933 was explicitly based on purported statutory au-
thority, not on powers derived from the Constitution itself.2 5  A handful of
recent seizures not clearly supported by statute, as Frankfurter argued,
presidential power ... can hardly serve as adequate authority for defining the President's constitu-
tional position.").
2419 343 U.S. at 610 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("Deeply embedded traditional ways of con-
ducting government cannot supplant the Constitution or legislation, but they give meaning to the
words of a text or supply them.") See also Taft, supra note 1, at 135-36 (discussing Myers v. United
States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (reporting a longstanding practice of having postal treaties concluded by
the Postmaster General).
21o See, e.g., M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401 (1819); Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 351-52 (1816); Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 309 (1803).
See generally D. CURRIE, supra note 1, at 77, 91-92, 160-61 (discussing this aspect of M'Culloch,
Martin, and Stuart). See also infra notes 263-66 and accompanying text (discussing Ray v. Blair, 343
U.S. 214 (1952)).
21" See Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863); see generally D. CURRIE, supra note 1, at
273-76 (discussing the Prize Cases).
22 See 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 613-14 (1800) (quoted in Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 684). John
Marshall, then a member of Congress, argued that until Congress acts, "it seems the duty of the
Executive department to execute the contract by any means it possesses." Id. at 614.
"' Treaty for the Cession of Louisiana, April 30, 1803, United States-France, 18 Stat. 232. See
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 ("The President... shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent
of the Senate, to make Treaties . . ").
214 Sawyer, 343 U.S. at 587; see Proclamation of Sept. 22, 1862, in 6 J. RICHARDSON, A CoMPI-
LATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 96 (1900).
255 343 U.S. at 647-48 n.16 (Jackson, J., concurring); see ROSENMAN, THE PUBLIC PAPERS
AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 4 (1933); Culp, Executive Power in Emergencies, 31
MICH. L. REV. 1066, 1078 & n.54 (1933) (expressing doubts about the adequacy of the statute
invoked).
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hardly constituted longstanding acquiescence in the existence of general
emergency authority.256
Because four of the majority Justices believed that Congress had forbid-
den the seizure, the question of Presidential authority to employ means of
law enforcement neither authorized nor forbidden was not definitively an-
swered. Youngstown nonetheless stands as an eloquent reminder that the
President must obey the law and that in general he may act only on the
basis of statute.
V. CONCLUSION
The opinions of Reed, Burton, Vinson, Minton, and Clark tended to be
colorless in both substance and style, and they set the dominant tone of the
period. Black and Douglas, joined by Murphy and Rutledge until their
deaths in 1949, regularly argued in dissent for greater protection of those
interests singled out by Justice Stone in the Carolene Products case: those
guaranteed by specific provisions of the Bill of Rights, the integrity of the
political process, and the rights of discrete and insular minorities.2"
Most interesting in terms of both style and substance were the relatively
unpredictable Jackson and Frankfurter. The latter, who shared Jeffer-
son's view that each Justice should write an opinion in important consti-
tutional cases,25 left us a legacy of no fewer than thirty-five concurring
and forty-two dissenting opinions during the Vinson years, affording an
unusually comprehensive picture of his views. 59 His voting pattern was
equally striking, for though justifiably known as an apostle of judicial re-
straint,260 he managed to dissent with some frequency from decisions re-
210 343 U.S. at 613 (contrasting United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915), where
the Court deferred to a longstanding practice of withdrawing public lands from sale despite a statute
making them available for purchase).
287 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938); see also Hughes 1,
supra note 1, at 554-55. See C. PRITCHETT, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE VINSON COURT 20 (1954)
("[T]he Court over which Vinson presided, if tested by the proportion of nonunanimous decisions
handed down, was more divided than any in Supreme Court history.").
2"" See American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 418 (1950). For Jefferson's
views, see D. CURRIE, supra note 1, at 196 n.11.
229 See Frank, 1947-48, supra note 184, at 51 (complaining that "more often the special opinion
seemed expression for its own sake, without anything really worth saying").
"0 See supra notes 115-30, 134-51 and accompanying text (discussing Beauharnais v. Illinois
and Dennis v. United States); see also Stone II, supra note 1, at 52-55 (discussing West Virginia
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jecting claims based upon the first, fourth, and fifth amendments. Once he
even dissented from a decision broadly construing the federal tax
power.26' In many of these cases he was joined by Jackson, who also
wrote a series of highly original and spicy separate opinions.2"2
One of these was a dissent, joined only by Justice Douglas, in the unde-
servedly neglected case of Ray v. Blair, where the majority upheld an
Alabama statute requiring candidates in party primaries for Presidential
electors to support whomever their party convention might select.26 ' Quot-
ing from the Federalist Papers, Jackson unimpeachably insisted that the
whole purpose of the Electoral College was to interpose the independent
judgment of the elector between the people and the choice of a presi-
dent.264 The majority relied on the fact that the system had never worked
as intended; as early as 1826 a Senate committee had lamented that elec-
tors had bartered away that judgment in exchange for votes from the very
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)).
281 See, e.g., Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (establishment of religion); Zorach v.
Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (same); American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382
(1950) (freedom of speech and association); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952) (search and
seizure); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) (search and seizure); Harris v. United
States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947) (search and seizure, self-incrimination); Shapiro v. United States, 335
U.S. 1 (1948) (self-incrimination); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953)
(right to hearing); United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953) (federal tax power). See Frank, The
Supreme Court of the United States: 1949-50, 18 U. CHl. L. REV. 1, 46 (1950) ("[A]fter years of
appearing at most a moderate on issues of civil rights, [Frankfurter] has again been made into a
'liberal' by the majority's turn to the right"); Jaffe, TheJudicial Universe of Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
62 HARv. L. REV. 357, 400-01 (1949) (arguing that the extreme deference exhibited in the Barnette
dissent did not reflect Frankfurter's own prior or subsequent position).
262 See, e.g., his concurrences in Kahriger, 345 U.S. at 34-36; Youngstown, 343 U.S. 634-55;
Dennis, 341 U.S. at 561-79; Railway Express, 336 U.S. 111-17; Woods, 333 U.S. 146-47.
26 343 U.S. 214 (1952) (Reed, J.).
2U Id. at 231, 232 & n.* (Jackson, J., joined by Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing THE FEDERAL-
IST No. 68, at 441-42 (A. Hamilton) (Earle ed. 1937)) (" 'It was equally desirable, that the immedi-
ate election should be made by men most capable of analyzing the qualities adapted to the station, and
acting under circumstances favorable to deliberation ..... '"). Compare Roger Sherman's objections
to a proposed amendment that would have recognized the people's right "to instruct their Representa-
tives" in Congress.
This cannot be admitted to be just, because it would destroy the object of their meeting. I
think, when the people have chosen a representative, it is his duty to meet others from the
different parts of the Union, and consult, and agree with them to such acts as are for the
general benefit of the whole community. If they were to be guided by instructions, there
would be no use in deliberation ....
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 763-64 (J. Gales ed. 1789).
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beginning.265 Protesting that "powers or discretions granted to federal offi-
cials by the Federal Constitution" cannot be "forfeited . . . for disuse,"
Jackson persuasively added that there was a difference between allowing
and requiring them to do so.26
Ray v. Blair is a sobering reminder of the limited capacity of law to
affect human behavior.
265 343 U.S. at 228 & n.15 (quoting S. REP. No. 22, 19th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1826)) ("'Electors,
therefore, have not answered the design of their institution. They are not the independent body and
superior characters which they were intended to be. . . . They have degenerated into mere agents
.... ' "). This report can hardly be viewed as a ringing endorsement of the practice in question.
266 343 U.S. at 233-35.
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